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This dissertation consists of three independent essays in financial and applied economics.
Essay One analyzes the impact of common ownership concentration on corporate payouts,
investments, and markups. The evaluated hypothesis is that a set of investors who own
significant equity stakes in two or more firms within the same industry (common ownership)
are able to decrease competition, raise markups, and increase payouts. The results confirm a
statistically significant increase in corporate payouts following an increase in industry-level
common ownership. I further show that the effect of common ownership concentration on
payouts is larger in industries that face relatively less competition from Chinese imports,
and is also larger in industries with low values of their Herfindahl indices.
Essay Two estimates the implications of divorce between individuals aged 50 and above
(‘gray divorce’) for all components of their wealth. The results suggest that gray divorce
negatively impacts net worth, especially components such as housing equity and financial
assets. There is no evidence of higher decline in net worth for females as compared to males.
However, divorcing females experience higher decline of their individual retirement account
balances, and, are more likely to re-enter the labor force. Wealth is also shown to be a key
(negative) predictor of the probability of gray divorce.
Essay Three tests the so-called ‘modernization hypothesis’, a positive effect of income on
democracy, examining the case of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after communism’s
collapse. I show that a highly important influence on the relation between income and
democracy in some post-socialist country is its initial political disruption: time between
collapse of the communist system and emergence of a new post-communist government. In
particular, I verify that the positive relation between income and democracy is significantly
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1.0 Introduction
This thesis includes three independent essays, one of which explores the role of common
ownership concentration for corporate payouts, investments and competition. The second
essay investigates implications of marital instability among those aged 50+ in regard to all
the components of their wealth. The third essay analyzes the nature of the relation between
income and democracy, using the case of post-socialist European economies. The three essays
are unrelated to each another, yet all feature a similar research approach, which is based on
application of econometric methods and relevant identification strategies.
Each of the considered topics is important in their own way. In relation to Essay One,
diversified institutional investors jointly hold 70-80% of the US stock market, resulting in
shareholder structures with high density of common ownership (Azar et al. 2016). For
example, the same few institutional investors, Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity, and State
Street, each hold sizable equity stakes of 2 - 7% in key companies across many industries,
including technology, pharmaceuticals, banks and airlines (Azar 2018). To date, researchers
and regulators still debate the common ownership potential to monopolize the US economy,
and also decline capital and R&D investments (Gutierrez and Philippon 2016). Another
vital phenomenon, which motivated Essay Two, is that of ‘gray divorce’. Between 1990 and
2015, divorce rates among the population aged 50+ more than doubled. Marital dissolution
between seniors is known to result in deterioration of mental and physical health, and,
increase social exclusion (Del Bono et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2012). Moreover, the population
aged 50+ comprises over 1/3 of the total US population, and, has the highest median savings
in comparison to all other population age groups. Therefore, gray divorce could possibly
affect negatively wealth among the ‘gray population’ category. Essay Three addresses the
importance of the relationship between income and democracy. During the past several years,
multiple developed and developing countries with previously high democratization records
marked tendency to move towards right-wing populist policies (FreedomHouse 2017). The
study of the case of the Eastern European countries who recently underwent the ‘natural
experiment’ of regime change could uncover further insights about the relation between
1
income and democracy, and the role of the initial political disruption for this.
The remaining part of my thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyzes the impact
of common ownership concentration on corporate payouts, investments, and markups. To
establish causality, I utilize a difference-in-differences method based on a major mutual fund
scandal. Also, as a test of the mechanism, I compare the effect of common ownership con-
centration on payouts and investments between industries with relatively high and relatively
low competition from Chinese imports. Chapter 3 explores the impact of gray divorce on
wealth. Examined categories include financial wealth, value of vehicles, and housing equity.
Semi-parametric difference-in-differences methodology is applied to ensure that individuals
from ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups are similar in all key respects, beyond the incidence of
divorce. The chapter then uses machine learning to study the main predictors of future di-
vorce among the population aged 50+. Chapter 4 analyses the case of post-socialist European
economies and the relation between income and democracy for these countries. following the
approach in Acemoglu et al. (2008), I use trade-weighted world income as an instrumental
variable to deal with reverse causality between income and democracy. The chapter suggests
a method to measure initial political disruption, and includes it as a moderation variable in
the regression of democracy on income. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings.
2
2.0 Common Ownership Concentration and Corporate Payouts
This essay analyzes the impact of common ownership concentration on corporate payouts,
investments, and markups. I hypothesize that when a set of investors owns significant
equity stakes in two or more firms within the same industry (common ownership), this
concentration of common ownership decreases competition, raises markups, and increases
payouts. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find a statistically significant increase in corporate
payouts following an increase in industry-level common ownership. To establish causation,
I rely on the use of difference-in-differences method based on a major mutual fund scandal.
I further show that the effect of common ownership concentration on payouts is larger in
industries that face relatively less competition from Chinese imports, as well as in industries
with low Herfindahl indices.
2.1 Introduction
Common ownership is a situation when a set of investors jointly own a significant stake
in a number of firms within the same industry. My study explores whether concentration of
common ownership influences corporate payouts. Therefore, this analysis connects the two
hotly disputed areas within the literature, namely that of common ownership concentration
and its negative effect on competition among firms (e.g. Azar 2018; Dennis et al. 2018; Koch
et al. 2019), and that about concerns regarding growing corporate payouts raising concerns
about excessive withdrawal of cash from the business that potentially limits its available
resources to invest and innovate (e.g. Fried and Wang 2018; Lazonick 2014).
The analysis in this study is performed in connection to the hypothesized negative effect
of common ownership on competition. Firms that operate in industries with high con-
centration of common ownership are argued to face reduced incentives to compete (Farrell
1985; Rotemberg 1984). There are two points of view in the ongoing debate about the
anti-competitive influences of concentrated common ownership. Some studies favored the
3
anti-competitive effect, including Azar (2018) for the case of airline industry, Azar et al.
(2016) for banking sector and Gutierrez and Philippon (2018) for a multi-industry set-up.
These researchers observed positive implications of common ownership for markups and
prices, and a negative effect on capital investments. Other studies did not confirm the afore-
mentioned negative impact of common ownership on competition, including Dennis et al.
(2018) and Koch et al. (2019). Therefore, the dispute regarding the implications of common
ownership for competition among firms is far from settled.
The concept of common ownership should be clearly distinguished from the related con-
cept of institutional ownership. Common ownership relates to a situation when two or more
firms are partly or fully owned by the same investor (group of investors) (Gilje et al. 2018).
Recent decades evidenced an increase in common ownership concentration due to the increase
in size and influence of institutional investors that are pursuing portfolio diversification eq-
uity investment strategies. Higher shareholdings by institutional investors with portfolio
diversification strategies resulted in a situation with a number of large institutional investors
commonly owning significant equity stakes in key market players within same industries
(Azar 2018) 1.
In the current study, I build on the view that common ownership reduces competition.
The link from increased common ownership concentration to lower competition and to in-
creased payouts goes as follows: when common ownership concentration increases in a given
industry, this lowers incentives to compete among the industry players because common
owners do not have incentives to promote competition (Azar 2018). This lack of competition
usually results in higher profits and cash flows due to benefits of higher market power. Sound
governance of common owners (institutional investors) would lead to withdrawal of increased
cash as payouts (Chung and Zhang 2011). But the latter step is not a mechanic identity,
as the increased cash resources available to the firms with concentrated common ownership
can also be used for alternative purposes, such as financing acquisitions, making debt repay-
1Investment Companies Act of 1940 sets restrictions for some types of investment companies. Specifically,
Sec 5(a)(1) defines diversified companies (most mutual funds) to face a 5% upper limit for 75 percent of
their assets, and besides to be restricted from acquiring more than 10% of voting stocks in a single company.
In addition, under Sec 12(d)(1)(A) of the Investment Companies Act, such companies cannot acquire more
than 3% of equity in an investing company, cannot spend more than 5% of their assets on stocks of another
investing company, and cannot spend more than 10% of their assets on stocks of several investing companies.
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ment, or building-up cash piles. In fact, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) evidenced the higher
propensity to vote for acquisition by firms with greater common ownership. A number of
previous studies showed that payouts can significantly differ across firms, depending on their
liquidity constraints, degree of financial leverage, as well as life-cycle stage, among other
relevant factors (Denis and Osobov 2008) 2.
Positive association between common ownership concentration and corporate payouts
may be due to other mechanisms, instead of the aforementioned anti-competitive effect
of the common ownership. For example, positive association between common ownership
concentration and corporate payouts could be related to the positive association between
institutional ownership and corporate payouts. Crane et al. (2016) evidenced that an increase
in institutional ownership usually resulted in higher payouts. Also Grinstein and Michaely
(2005) showed that institutional investors are attracted to and thus tend to invest more in
the firms that provide generous payouts. Such possible alternative mechanisms are taken
into consideration, and are controlled for, in the empirical design of the current study.
Obtaining an answer to the mentioned research question would contribute towards eval-
uation of the nature of common ownership concentration and its broader economic implica-
tions. this can provide further insights into the driving forces behind the corporate payout
policy and thus contribute to the ongoing debate about the nature of corporate buybacks3.
The body of literature in the realm of anti-competitive influences of concentrated com-
mon ownership is a rapidly growing one. The possibility of anti-competitive effect of con-
centrated common ownership was explored and confirmed by Azar (2018) in the case of
airline industry4, and also by Azar et al. (2016) in the case of deposit banking industry.
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) included common ownership in a synthetic measure of total
2SEC Rule 10b-18 sets limit for the open market share repurchases at 25% of the average daily volume.
The rule is not mandatory and serves as a liability protection for companies (’safe harbor rule’). If repurchases
are implemented in excess of the mentioned rule, company management is not protected for prosecution for
fraudulent stock market activities
3In the mentioned heated debate about corporate payouts, some have argued that increase in share
buybacks by the US corporations can lead towards declining investments and weaker growth (Lazonick
(2014)). While the opponents, such as Fried and Wang (2018) countered this view and argued that observed
increased payouts are relevant only to large mature firms, mostly constituents of S&P index, which are only
a small fraction of all the US firms. Whereas investments for all other firms were on the rise and their cash
balances were increasing.
4For a detailed overview of recent developments in the common ownership literature refer to Schmalz
(2018).
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concentration (Modified HHI) to argue about declining domestic competition and explore
its effect on investments. They concluded that overall market concentration generally led to
higher mark-ups and lower capital investments economy-wide. A somewhat different view
was expressed by He and Huang (2017), who explored implications of common ownership
for the same industry firms and concluded that it facilitates collaboration and coordination
via forming strategic alliances and joint ventures. In addition, there are studies that deny
the mechanism that common ownership decreases competition. For example, Dennis et al.
(2018) replicated the study by Azar (2018), but did not confirm the mentioned findings for
airline industry. Also Koch et al. (2019) investigated the causal effect of common ownership
on investments and product market competition on the industry-by-industry basis, and for
the majority of industries they could not obtain such evidence. Again, it can be inferred
that the link between common ownership and declining competition is far from being fully
established. Moreover, neither of the mentioned studies explicitly explored the causal impact
of common ownership on corporate payouts. According to my knowledge, available literature
has lacked causal analysis of common ownership effect on corporate payouts, so this study
aims to fill this research gap. Analysis of the effect of common ownership concentration on
corporate payouts is of importance as such, but it also provides a rigorous opportunity to
test the anti-competitive effect of common ownership. Such opportunity relates to the fact
that a number of other alternative mechanisms exist that underlie the positive correlation
between common ownership and payouts. Therefore, the current study conducts several
tests of the mechanism. Specifically, it explores whether an external source of competition
that is beyond the control of the US common owners, such as that of the ‘China shock’,
lowers the extent that common ownership affects payouts and investments. Also, the study
investigates whether the effect of common ownership concentration on payouts is stronger
in industries with low concentration, where there is more room for the common owners to
facilitate decrease in the competition and foster consolidation.
The remaining parts of the study are organized as follows: the common ownership hy-
pothesis in relation to competition and corporate payouts is discussed in Section 2. Then
Section 3 lists the sources of data, describes sample selection procedures, explains calcula-
tion of the key variables. Section 4 introduces the research methodology and identification
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strategy. The main findings of the study are presented in Section 5. The baseline findings
are verified by the tests of the mechanisms in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes with the
summary of the key findings and some suggestions regarding venues for the future research.
2.2 The Common Ownership Hypothesis
The hypothesis aims to evaluate the effect of common ownership on payouts via its
anti-competitive effect. The main hypothesis:
 Common ownership concentration in the given industry causes higher corporate payouts
in that industry.
This hypothesis views positive effect of common ownership on payouts as a part of the
anti-competitive impact of common ownership. In industries with higher common ownership
there are lower incentives to compete, and higher efforts to coordinate and cooperate (Azar
2018, He and Huang 2017). This would lead to higher market power of the commonly
owned firms. With the higher market power, the firms in the industries with concentrated
common ownership can earn higher profits and generate higher cash flows. Then, because
of high monitoring capacity of the common owners who are institutional investors, they
can facilitate withdrawal of excessive cash in the form of payouts, in order to mitigate the
agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In addition to the explained
above mechanism of common ownership affect on payouts, there can also be an impact
of common ownership on capital investments that goes as follows: the optimum level of
output for a more concentrated industry is lower than for a similar industry with lower level
of concentration (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017). Hence the required production capacity
decreases, the level of capital investments can go down in an industry with concentrated
common ownership.
The current study allows for other explanations of positive association between common
ownership concentration and corporate payouts. Under such alternative hypothesis, common
ownership concentration would be correlated with, but not causing, higher payouts. These
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other mechanisms rely on positive correlation between common ownership and institutional
ownership, and then explain the link between institutional ownership and payouts. The two
such alternative channels are the effect of payouts on institutional ownership, and the effect
of institutional ownership on payouts.
The first alternative mechanism is based on the evidence that institutional ownership
influences payouts. Crane et al. (2016) determined that increase in institutional ownership
positively affected dividend payments. This is also related to earlier studies regarding the
role of institutional owners, as well as that of debt holders, to reduce the agency costs of free
cash flows (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The study by Crane et al. (2016) relied on exogenous
shocks to institutional ownership due to transitions between Russell 2000 and Russell 1000
indices. Limitation of this identification strategy is that transitions between the two indices
involves only a small fraction of all listed firms (Almeida et al. 2018; Gutierrez and Philippon
2018). Therefore, presumably positive association between common ownership and payouts
could be driven by the effect of institutional ownership alone, and not by the anti-competitive
effect of common ownership.
The second alternative is based on the fact that institutional investors prefer mature com-
panies that are generous dividend-payers and that also implement regular buybacks. The
mentioned causal relation between institutional ownership and corporate payouts was ex-
plored by Grinstein and Michaely (2005). The researchers used panel vector auto-regression
methodology and concluded that institutions are attracted by dividend paying firms, and
moreover, by those who regularly implement share repurchases. But no evidence was ob-
tained by Grinstein and Michaely (2005) in support of the hypothesis that institutional
ownership concentration influences payout policies.
To allow for the above mentioned alternative explanations, the regression analysis in
this study includes institutional ownership among the covariates. In addition, one of the
tests relies on exogenous shock to common ownership in order to establish causality using
difference-in-differences method. Several tests of the anti-competitive mechanism of the
common ownership are performed also. The first such test explores whether exposure to the
‘China shock’ lowers the effect of common ownership concentration on payouts and capital
investments. The second test of the mechanism investigates whether the effect of common
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ownership on payouts and investments differs between industries with different levels of
Herfindahl index.
2.3 Data, Sampling and Variables Construction
2.3.1 Data and sampling
The data for the study was obtained from the following databases. Financial statements
data was obtained from Capital IQ, institutional ownership information - from Thomson
Reuters 13F5, and the data on the imports and total sales by industry - from Bureau of
Economic Analysis database.
The initial sample includes all public companies in the US for the time period between
2000 and 2018. Thus the focus is specifically on the period when the decrease in the domestic
competition was taking place, according to Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017). Industries were
defined based on 3-digit codes of standard industry classification (SIC3 codes). Following
standard approach in the finance research (e.g. Chung and Zhang (2011); Denis and Osobov
(2008); Koch et al. (2018)) the database was filtered to exclude financial services companies
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and those from utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and
4949). Furthermore, the firms with annual sales less than $0.25 million, and total assets less
than $1.0 million were excluded. Also, the listed firms with sales revenue that are lower than
their EBIT (operating profit) were omitted. All variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% in
order to eliminate possible contaminating effect of outliers, following He and Huang (2017).
The resulting sample included data on over 10,350 corporations.
2.3.2 Variables construction
The study considers several measures of common ownership concentration, which are
mostly industry-level variables. These industry-level measures include Density of common
5Thomson Reuters 13F database is based on the data from mandatory quarterly 13F forms that all US
institutional investors, with at least $100 million in assets under management, are required to file to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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ownership (DCO), Percentage of common funds (PCF), Percentage of common stocks (PCS),
as well as delta HHI (∆HHI) 6. Besides, there are two company-level measures, namely the
dummy for cross-owned firms (CrossDummy) and the number of the same industry rivals that
are commonly owned by at least one same institutional owner (NumConnected). Definitions
of the firm-specific indicators follow He and Huang (2017).
Ideally, these measures should be applied to individual markets and by considering all
investors into the market players. Practical implementation is limited to consider institu-
tional investors only, and also is applied using grouping of firms into industries, using SIC3
industries classification, rather than markets (Schmalz (2018)).
The current study performed simulation of the ways that main industry-level common
ownership indicators (DCO, PCF, PCS and ∆HHI) respond to changes in the number of
market players, common owners and ownership shares by common owners (Appendix A.3 ).
The results of such simulation indicated that while neither of the considered measures of
common ownership is fully compelling, there is relatively better performance of DCO measure
in comparison to the other considered ones.
Density of common ownership (DCO) is the ratio of connected firm pairs to total number
of firm pairs. DCO measures the density of the network of firms within the same industry,
and it is an average level of connections within the industry. Connected firms pair has at
least one common institutional investors with ownership share of at least 5% in each of the
two firms in the pair. This definition follows the use of DCO in Azar (2011) and Koch et al.





, where Iij ∈ {0, 1} (1)
Percentage of common funds (PCF) is the ratio of the number of institutional investors
who own at least two stocks in the given industry to the total number of institutional investors
in that industry. The considered ownership share threshold is 5%, following the use of PCF
in Anton and Polk (2014) and Koch et al. (2018). The equation below indicates that there
6Gilje et al. (2018) implement review of alternative measures of common ownership concentration and
their use in the literature. There is no straightforward consensus evidenced as for the choice of some most
preferred measure of the common ownership.
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are K institutional investors in the given industry. Also, |ωk| denotes the size (cardinality)





, where |ωk| ≥ 0 (2)
Percentage of common stocks (PCS) is the ratio of the number of stocks that are com-
monly owned with at least one other stock in the same industry to the total number of stocks
in that industry. The considered threshold for ownership share is 5%, following Koch et al.
(2018). In the expression below, N is the total number of firms in the industry. Also, |J | is
the size (cardinality) of the set of the other firms in the industry that are commonly owned




, where |J | ≥ 0 (3)
Delta HHI index (∆HHI) is an indicator that was designed as an extension to the stan-
dard HHI (Herfindahl index), aiming to capture concentration among owners (Azar 2018).
Only ownership shares for institutions with at least 0.5% are considered in the calculation
of ∆HHI, following Koch et al. (2019). The indicator is well-rooted in theory, but it has
relatively limited practical applications (Schmalz 2018).




Where, sj and sk are market shares (calculated based on revenue) of firms j and k,
respectively. Also, γij indicates the percent share of control by shareholder i in firm j,
and βik represents the percent share of ownership by shareholder i in firm k. For practical
consideration, for the calculation it is assumed that the two shares (control and ownership)
are equal, namely that γij = βij (Schmalz 2018).
Despite its theoretical appeal and connection to HHI, ∆HHI has some major limitations.
One limitation was pointed out by Koch et al. (2019) - a merger between two common owners
would lead to a decrease in ∆HHI, rather than to an increase that could be reasonably
expected. Simulations that were performed in the current study (Appendix A.3), indicate
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that mergers among market payers can also lead to decrease in ∆HHI, which is also a
counter-intuitive behavior. Such surprising results are in line with the criticism by Schmalz
(2018) who claimed that empirical qualities of ∆HHI are not well studied, unlike those of
traditional HHI. While HHI is limited at 10,000 for a perfect monopoly, the upper limit of
∆HHI is not well defined, often can reach values in excess of millions, and this prevents its
use for the purpose of antitrust regulation and oversight (Schmalz 2018) 7. A simple test,
namely evaluation of possible change in a measure of common ownership due to simulated
merger between institutions, can be used for validating performance of different common
ownership concentration indicators. Unlike for ∆HHI, in case of DCO, PCF and PCS, a
merger between two block holders is likely to increase value of the measures of common
ownership, which is in line with the expectations.
As additional measures, few firm-level indicators are considered. CrossDummy is equal
to one for the firm in the given year, when there is at least one more firm in the same
industry that is commonly owned by one or more institutional investors. The considered
ownership threshold is that of 5%. NumConnect shows the number of other firms, which
are commonly owned with the given firm i in the same industry and in the given year. The
same 5% ownership threshold is applied. ‘Commonly owned’ denotes that there is at least
one institutional investor that has ownership share in the given firm i and in at least one
more company in the same industry.
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for common ownership concentration, payouts, and control variables
are in Tables 2-1 and 2-2. For the total sample, the results indicate that among firms with
positive payouts, the mean payouts to total assets ratio is 5.82%, there are 27% of dividend-
paying firms-year observations, and 31% of observations with positive net share buybacks.
On average, there are 101 firms per industry. Also, ‘standard’ concentration measured by
Herfindahl index has the mean of 1,577, and ranges between 0 and 10,000.
7”Horizontal Merger Guidelines” (08/19/2010) by the Department of Justice prescribe that mergers lead-
ing to an increase in the market HHI by 100-200 points typically warrant scrutiny.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the whole sample
Mean St Dev Min Max N
DCO 0.14 0.16 0.00 1.00 110,382
CrossDummy 0.098 0.297 0.00 1.00 112,012
NumConnect 2.35 13.07 0.00 186 112,012
PCF 0.049 0.034 0 0.25 110,382
PCS 0.748 0.257 0 1.00 110,382
Payouts1 5.82 15.43 0.00 1261.6 112,262
Dividends 4.55 16.01 0.00 1261.2 112,262
Buybacks 4.37 10.50 0.00 461.7 106,972
M&A 7.18 11.26 0.00 162.42 102,528
Cash 19.20 22.71 -0.33 100.0 106,964
Total assets 4,027 20,003 1.0 798,000 106,972
Markup 105.96 486.52 0.13 134,450 106,499
Capex 6.15 16.79 -43.60 3696.76 105,852
Leverage 33.49 790.09 -41900 182000 106,646
EBIT -5.91 47.73 -2369.55 1326.5 106,480
Tobin’s q 1.79 7.56 <0.001 1384.8 89,295
HHI 1576.9 1503.3 0.00 10000 112,012
No. firms (sic3) 101.2 130.2 1.00 564 110,382
Proportions:
Payouts > 0 44.3%
Dividends > 0 26.7%
Buybacks > 0 31.2%
M&A > 0 38.6%
Net Income < 0 40.3%
Sample covers all public firms from 2000 till 2017. SIC3 industry classification is used. For Payouts,
Dividends, Buybacks, and M&A: means and standard deviations are calculated for positive values.
1 Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, Cash and M&A are scaled by Total Assets.
Comparison was performed for sub-group of firms by low and high degree of common
ownership in the industry. Where low (high) was defined as, respectively, values of DCO
below the 1st quartile and above the 3rd quartile. Comparison of the results indicate that
the firms in industries with high DCO provide relatively payouts, higher buybacks, and tend
to invest less. Moreover, these firms, on average, have higher cash balances. Among the
firms in industries with high ownership concentration, there is 9.1 percentage points higher
propensity to do share buybacks.
These results cannot used to infer that common ownership concentration lowers invest-
ment and drives up buybacks. This is because the compared mean differences can be jointly
determined by other variables. There can be selection bias, as common ownership concen-
tration can be driven by higher payouts in these industries. Therefore, the analysis in the
following sections is provided to evaluate the causal impact of common ownership concen-
tration on payouts.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics by level of DCO
Low DCO High DCO
Low DCO –
High DCO
Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev N
DCO 0.018 0.014 27,678 0.347 0.195 27,723 -0.33 ***
CrossDummy 0.089 0.285 27,678 0.114 0.318 27,723 -0.025 ***
NumConnect 1.545 8.691 27,678 3.661 18.427 27,723 -2.116 ***
PCF 0.037 0.041 27,678 0.050 0.029 27,723 -0.012***
PCS 0.496 0.348 27,678 0.898 0.092 27,723 -0.402***
Assets 5,272 24,816 26,395 3,816 16,138 26,737 1,455 ***
Payouts 1 5.45 14.18 27,678 5.82 18.05 27,723 -0.36 **
Dividends 4.56 12.55 27,678 4.19 20.57 27,723 0.37*
Buybacks 3.86 12.25 26,395 4.33 8.67 26,737 -0.47 ***
M&A 7.23 11.47 24,927 6.87 10.81 25,911 0.36**
Cash 16.49 20.66 26,393 21.19 23.47 26,733 -4.69***
Markup 117.21 937.7 26,171 105.13 266.5 26,677 12.07 **
Capex 7.81 12.28 25,895 4.50 6.16 26,594 3.31 ***
Leverage 34.24 628.03 26,339 32.04 311.46 26,641 2.19
EBIT/ TA -6.16 49.85 26,165 -5.48 48.12 26,676 -0.68
Tobin’s Q 1.59 5.02 21,189 1.86 11.11 22,815 -0.26 ***
HHI (sic3) 1,794 1,684 27,678 1,726 1,665 27,723 67.48 ***
No. firms (sic3) 104.7 163.0 27,678 82.9 111.4 27,723 21.74 ***
Proportions:
Payouts > 0 43.4% 49.8% -6.4%***
Dividends > 0 28.2% 30.8% -2.6%***
Buybacks > 0 27.9% 37.1% -9.1% ***
M&A > 0 39.0% 38.4% 0.6% *
Net Income < 0 40.6% 38.4% 2.2% ***
Low DCO and High DCO, respectively, include firms from the industries with DCO below Q1 and above
Q3. For Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, M&A, their means and standard deviations are calculated for
positive values. In the lower part of the table, proportions of positive values are provided. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1 Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex and M&A are scaled by Total Assets.
Dynamics of the average common ownership concentration, using two alternative mea-
sures (DCO and Number Connect), weighted by market capitalization, are shown in Figure
2.1. These tend to increase over time.
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Figure 2.1: Dynamics of common ownership concentration
Note: Considered time period is 2000 - 2017, industries are defined following SIC3 classification. Market
value-weighted means are determined for each year
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of dividend and buyback ratios, prevalence of payouts
Note: Left figure includes Dividends/ Assets and Net buybacks/ Assets ratios. Right figure shows percentage
of firms with positive dividends and positive net buybacks
Dynamics of corporate payouts is shown in fig. 2.2 and can be compared to that of the
common ownership concentration measures in fig. 2.1. During 2000-2017 there was increase
in dividends, while buybacks fluctuated wildly (left part). Such behavior is in line with the
nature of these two categories of payouts of which dividends tend to be stable as firms are
usually reluctant to introduce changes into dividends per share, while buybacks are paid-out
in a discretionary manner (DeAngelo et al. 2009). Specifically there was a sharp fall in the
buybacks to assets ratio in 2019 during the global financial crisis. The right part of the
figure shows proportion of the firms that paid dividends and buybacks among all firms in
15




For the analysis of the effect of common ownership concentration on payouts, as well as
on capital investments and other outcomes, the following regression is used as the foundation:
Outcomeijt = β0 + β1COCjt + δ1Xijt + δ2Zjt + νj +mt + uijt (5)
In the equation, outcome variable is one of the following – ‘Payouts’, ‘Dividends’, ‘Buy-
backs’, ’Markup’ and ‘Capex’, calculated as was detailed in the previous section. Separate
equation is estimated for each of the mentioned outcomes. Where, ’Payouts’, ’Dividends’
and ’Buybacks’ are, respectively, the ratio of net total payouts, dividends and net share
buybacks, to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of the sum of net fixed capital expenditures
and R&D expenses to total assets. COC is a measure of common ownership concentration,
and in most analyses density of common ownership (DCO) is used.
Moreover, Zjt is vector of the industry-level covariates, such as industry HHI, and the
number of firms in industry j, while Xijt is vector of the company-specific covariates: log of
total assets, leverage, negative net income dummy, retained earnings to total equity ratio,
revenue growth rate and cash to total assets ratio. The equation also controls for the set of
industry-specific and time fixed effects.
Analysis of the sample structure indicates that large firms account for almost all total
dividends, buybacks, acquisitions, and total assets. Firms above the top quartile by total
assets accounted for over 97% of all dividends, buybacks and total assets, as well as over
94.5% of acquisitions in 2017 (figure 2.3). Moreover, firms below the median by total assets
provided less than 0.5% of all payouts, acquisitions and total assets. These facts dictate
that firm size (measured by market capitalization) is used as the weighting factor for all the
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regression analyses, providing higher weight for relatively small number of large firms and
lower weights for much more numerous small firms.









Low quartile 2nd quartile
3rd quartile Top quartile
Note: Firms are grouped into quartiles by total assets. The figure shows shares in total amount of dividends,
buybacks, acquisitions, and total assets that each quartile accounted for in the end of 2017
With equation (5) there is a serious endogeneity problem, as the causal relation between
the payouts and common ownership concentration can go both directions. The main consid-
ered mechanism is that increased common ownership concentration lowers competition and
raises payouts. But there can be other ways for the relation between payouts and common
ownership concentration. Such alternative possibility is that investments by institutional in-
vestors are directed toward firms with higher payouts, so higher payouts would cause higher
institutional investors and thus higher common ownership 8. To control for the reverse causal
link, a number of tests are performed. First, the analysis is performed using matched sample.
The use of propensity score matching ensures that the levels of observable covariates, includ-
ing lagged payouts and institutional ownership, are not systematically different between the
8In the obtained sample, correlation between institutional ownership and DCO measure of common
ownership is positive and significant at 1% significance level.
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treated and control groups. Further, the difference-in-differences approach is applied to en-
sure identification that relies on exogenous changes in common ownership, which was driven
by the well-known mutual fund scandal in 2003 and it can be reliably assumed not to be af-
fected by payouts. Additional testing involves considering for the different exposure of goods
industries to international competition captured by the ‘China shocks’, as well as considering
for the different exposure to the market concentration as captured by Herfindahl.
2.4.2 Identification strategy
Relevant identification strategy is required in order to evaluate whether increases in
common ownership concentration lead to higher corporate payouts. The analysis based on
simple correlations does not reliably work as the positive relation between common ownership
and payouts can be due to the fact that institutional ownership is attracted by high payouts.
Two approaches are applied in this study. Of these, one is the use of propensity score
matching that aims to imitate random assignment of common ownership concentration.
While the other approach explores exogeneity of a natural experiment shock due to mutual
fund scandal in September 2003.
2.4.2.1 Propensity score matching One of possibilities behind positive association
between common ownership concentration and payouts is that institutional investors are
attracted to companies with generous payouts policies (Grinstein and Michaely (2005)). As
accumulation of institutional ownership in the industry also increases common ownership,
this implies that payouts may cause higher common ownership concentration. This possible
link was already argued to represent significant identification problem in a test of common
ownership concentration effect on payouts. Propensity score matching is therefore aiming
to deal with this problem by ensuring a match on lagged observable variables between the
treated and control groups. It is implemented by matching observations in the group of firms
with high common ownership concentration (above the median) with observations from the
group of firms with low common ownership concentration. Propensity score matching aims
to achieve the balance in the matched sample so that the situation with the treatment and
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control groups being similar in all other aspects, except for the treatment effect (King and
Nielsen (2018)). Matching was performed based on propensity scores, which were estimated
using the lagged variables - size, institutional ownership, total payouts, cash, operating profit,
Herfindahl index, and CrossDummy. Matching was performed on year-by-year basis.
2.4.2.2 Difference-in-differences This identification approach aims to exploit the exo-
geneity of a change in common ownership due to mutual fund scandal in September 2003. A
large group of mutual funds used malpractices in their trading strategies, which gave rise to
the scandal as many investors in these funds were disappointed and embarrassed and with-
drew their funds. Subsequently the ownership of these mutual funds decreased significantly
9. Involved in the scandal 25 families of mutual funds lost over the next two years some
24.3% of their capital, of which 14.1% were lost in the first year following the scandal (Kisin
2011).
Such change can be reliably considered exogenous of the payouts and other corporate
decisions of the portfolio firms. Institutional ownership was redistributed among the mul-
tiple other institutional investors, and this redistribution influenced the common ownership
concentration. In fact, the mentioned scandal event has caused some decline in the aver-
age common ownership concentration for the industries with prior heavy ownership of the
scandal funds during years 2003-2005 (figure 2.4).
9The list of the scandal mutual fund families is obtained from Houge and Wellman (2005).
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Figure 2.4: Mean DCO for industries involved in the scandal
Note: Each line shows mean DCO for the respective group of SIC3 industries
Difference-in-differences approach was applied, as follows. The time and treatment dum-
mies, a well as their interaction are included into the regression model, instead of DCO.
Of these additional variables, the time dummy is an indicator variable denoting the after-
scandal time that starts from year 2003 onward (Postt). The treatment subset indicator
(Treatedj) indicates the SIC3 industries that were in the top decile by the ratio of the
scandal blockholders ownership in the industry (Koch et al. 2018).
Outcomeijt = β0 + β1Treatedj + β2Postt + β3Treatedj · Postt+
δ1Xijt + δ2Zjt + νj +mt + uijt (6)
While the mentioned scandal resulted in changed institutional ownership of the portfo-
lio companies and not just common ownership concentration, the DID regression directly
controls for institutional ownership by including it into the list of covariates.
Additionally, two tests of the mechanisms were implemented aiming to additionally evalu-
ate relevance of the common ownership concentration hypothesis and its impact on corporate
payouts. The first test explores the hypothesis that exposure to import competition depresses
the anti-competitive effect of common ownership. While the second evaluates the hypothesis
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that anti-competitive effect of common ownership, and thus its impact on payouts, is more
significant in industries that are less concentrated.
2.5 Findings
The effect of common ownership concentration on payouts and other outcomes is eval-
uated by controlling for relevant covariates, as well as for the time- and industry-specific
fixed effects. The results from fixed effects OLS regressions are considered first (Tables 2.3
and 2.4). Of these, the effect of the industry-level common ownership on payouts and other
outcomes is evaluated in Table 2.3. Additionally, interaction between industry-level and
firm-level common ownership is explored in Table 2.4. Findings from the analysis using
matched samples are provided in tables 2.6 and 2.7. Then the results are presented from the
difference-in-differences regression estimation (Table 2.8).
2.5.1 Baseline panel results
The anti-competitive effect of common ownership concentration is expected to increase
total payouts, decrease capital expenditures, raise margins and more active industry con-
solidation via M&A. Basic set of firm-specific covariates is included by following Gutierrez
and Philippon (2018) – size (log of total assets), cash flow to assets ratio, book value lever-
age, annual sales growth, as well as the industry-specific market concentration measured by
Herfindahl index (HHI), and log of the number of firms in the industry. Moreover, industry-
specific (SIC3) and time-specific fixed effects are included.
Results in Table 2.3 show that DCO exhibits significant positive association with corpo-
rate payouts (columns 1 - 3), and significant negative association with capital expenditures
(column 5) 10. The effect of common ownership on markups and acquisition activity is
positive but not significant. The analysis in Table 2.3 is prone to the endogeneity issues,
10The baseline results were also confirmed using Tobit model, as well as using regression with firm-level
fixed effects. All the discussed effects of common ownership were confirmed under these alternative model
specifications. These additional results are provided in Appendix A.4 and Appendix A.5, respectively.
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due to the possibility of reverse causal linkage between payouts and common ownership.
Previously, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) showed positive causal effect of payouts on insti-
tutional ownership. Similar reverse linkages are possible between common ownership and
other included outcome variables - capital investments, margins, M&A investments. There-
fore, the estimated coefficients are prone to the bias. In order to overcome this problem,
the difference-in-differences design test was applied and its results are provided further in
subsection 2.5.3 below.
Table 2.3: Baseline panel results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Dividends Buybacks Markup Capex M&A
DCO 0.715*** 0.375*** 0.357** 3.427 -0.453*** 0.218

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,171 76,138
Industries (SIC3) 245 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.580 0.706 0.510 0.045 0.414 0.139
Covariates are Inst own, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1,
HHI, Size. t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Payouts,
Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO is density of common ownership.
Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market
capitalization. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values for
payouts and M&A)
Further the analysis explores the effect of common ownership concentration by consid-
ering the interaction of the industry-level measure of common ownership and the firm-level
one. Indicator variable CrossDummy is included in the regression equation, as well as its
interaction term with DCO. The interaction term compares the effect of common owner-
ship concentration for the firms that are commonly owned (cross-owned) and other firms in
that industry. The findings confirm positive impact of the industry-level measure (DCO) on
payouts and its negative effect on capital expenditures, as in the baseline results. In addi-
tion, the interaction of CrossDummy with DCO is also relevant as the effect of common
ownership on payouts and M&A investment differs significantly between cross-owned and
not cross-owned firms. There is stronger positive impact of common ownership on dividend
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payments of cross-owned firms. Common ownership concentration is evidenced to have a
higher effect on M&A investment in the case of commonly owned firms.
Table 2.4: Panel results with cross-owned firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Div Net BB Markup Capex M&A
DCO 0.643*** 0.336*** 0.361** 2.712 -0.492*** -0.005
(3.59) (5.33) (2.39) (0.87) (-2.93) (-0.02)
DCO × CrossDummy 0.494 0.339*** -0.142 4.531 0.157 1.748***
(1.45) (2.84) (-0.50) (0.76) (0.49) (4.51)
CrossDummy -0.187** -0.027 -0.123* -2.277 -0.218*** -0.189**

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,171 76,138
Industries (SIC3) 245 245 245 245 245 245
F-test 9.28*** 23.18*** 2.85* 0.88 4.31** 10.79***
R-squared 0.580 0.706 0.510 0.045 0.414 0.139
Covariates include Inst own, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1,
Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total as-
sets. DCO is density of common ownership. Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years.
CrossDummy equals 1 and 0 to denote cross-owned firms. Regressions are weighted using total market
capitalization. Parentheses include t-stats. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-test
evaluates the null hypothesis that the sum of DCO and DCO × CrossDummy coefficients is zero. In-
cluded mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values for payouts and M&A
Appendix A.6 includes wide format results that are equivalent to the ones above. Wide
format results are organized by considering separately the sub-set of firms that are cross-
owned and those that are not cross-owned. The wide representation of results can be more
straightforward for the purpose of interpretation of the findings.
2.5.2 Propensity score matching analysis
Propensity score matching methodology is used to emulate random assignment of the
treatment (high density of common ownership) effect. The treatment group included firms
in industries with high level of DCO (fourth quartile and above). Matched sample was
constructed as a subset of the total sample, for each ’treated’ firm a control one was picked,
based on matching variables - lagged size, profitability margin, cash ratio, institutional
23
ownership, payouts ratio, Herfindahl index and CrossDummy. Matching was performed on
the year by year basis, to prevent selection of the same firm into the treated and control
groups. Selection of the matched control observations was implemented without replacement.
After propensity scores were predicted from the logit model, nearest neighbor algorithm was
used to select the best control firm. 11.
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics by DCO levels for unmatched and matched samples
Unmatched sample Matched sample
High DCO Low DCO Diff High DCO Low DCO Diff
DCOt 0.311 0.089 -0.221*** 0.323 0.086 -0.236***
Sizet−1 5.964 5.580 -0.383*** 5.975 5.994 0.019
Ownt−1 0.040 0.028 -0.012*** 0.042 0.041 -0.001
Payoutst−1/TAt−1 2.395 1.846 -0.549*** 2.484 2.458 -0.025
Casht−1/TAt−1 14.97 21.36 6.39*** 15.02 14.13 -0.889***
EBITt−1/TAt−1 2.918 -5.521 -8.439*** 2.906 3.092 0.186
HHIt−1 2007.2 1416.3 -590.8*** 1976.1 1893.5 -82.59***
CrossDummyt−1 0.100 0.095 -0.004** 0.102 0.105 0.003
No.firms 23,689 72,238 22,506 22,506
Notes: The two considered sub-samples are ‘High DCO’ and ’Low DCO’. These are respectively firms
from the industries with DCO above the 3rd quartile and that below the 1st quartile. Sig. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The table above compares the treatment and control groups before (unmatched sam-
ple) and after (matched sample) the matching procedure was performed. The summary
statistics comparison indicates that matching helped to improve balance between the two
groups by eliminating or at least considerably lowering the differences between the treatment
and control subsets. The differences was eliminated for size, institutional ownership, pay-
outs, profitability and CrossDummy (Table 2.6). Between the distribution of treated and
control samples significant overlap was confirmed by comparison of their propensity scores
distribution (Appendix A.2)
Results obtained from the regression using the matched sample (table 2.6) provide con-
firmation of the baseline panel data results. Namely, common ownership concentration has
positive effect on payouts, including both dividends and buybacks. Also, there is evidenced of
negative common ownership concentration effect on capital investments, and positive impact
on M&A investments. Moreover, the obtained coefficients from matched samples are higher
11Analysis was performed using R package ‘MatchIt’, following the guidelines regarding application of
PSM in Randolph et al. (2014). Critical evaluation of PSM method in King and Nielsen (2018) was taken
into consideration, specifically the need to scale the matching variables, and the reservations against using
replacement sampling.
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in their magnitude and more statistically significant as compared to the ones in baseline
panel regression.
Table 2.6: Panel results using matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Div Net BB Markup Capex M&A
DCO 1.955*** 0.432*** 1.495*** 2.760 -0.739*** 0.653**

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24,327 24,327 24,327 24,327 24,273 23,644
Industries (SIC3) 239 239 239 239 239 239
R-squared 0.614 0.765 0.537 0.169 0.554 0.174
Covariates include Inst own, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1,
Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total as-
sets. DCO is density of common ownership. Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years.
Regressions are weighted using total market capitalization. Parentheses include t-stats. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional
on positive values for payouts and M&A
The next table below provides the results of regression estimation including the interac-
tion between DCO and CrossDummy. Such analysis aims to compare the effect of industry-
level density of common ownership for the firms that are commonly owned versus the other
firms in that industry. The obtained results are generally in line with the equivalent baseline
specification. In fact, for commonly owned firms the effect of DCO on dividends is higher,
but the effect on net buybacks seems to be lower, than for non-commonly owned ones. In
addition, the effect of DCO on M&A investments by commonly owned firms is high in mag-
nitude and significant suggesting that common owners use these firms to facilitate industry
consolidation. There could probably be a trade-off between the effect of higher DCO on
buybacks and its effect on M&A investments by commonly owned firms. The exact relation
would depend on the specific industry, available possibilities for its further consolidation and
future growth opportunities.
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Table 2.7: Panel results with cross-owned firms using matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Div Net BB Markup Capex M&A
DCO 2.014*** 0.359*** 1.642*** 2.171 -0.663*** 0.292
(7.37) (4.04) (7.01) (1.16) (-3.90) (1.04)
DCO × CrossDummy -0.448 0.578*** -1.195*** 1.798 -0.107 2.003***
(-0.92) (3.67) (-2.88) (0.54) (-0.35) (4.16)
CrossDummy 0.081 -0.091* 0.168 -2.137** 0.338*** -0.741***

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24,327 24,327 24,327 24,327 24,273 23,644
Industries (SIC3) 239 239 239 239 239 239
F-test 27.61*** 19.88*** 25.24*** 1.05 8.56*** 11.19***
R-squared 0.614 0.765 0.537 0.169 0.554 0.175
Covariates include Inst own, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1,
Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total as-
sets. DCO is density of common ownership. CrossDummy equals to 1 and 0 denoting cross-owned firms.
Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market
capitalization. Parentheses include t-stats. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-test
evaluates the null hypothesis that the sum of DCO and DCO × CrossDummy coefficients is zero. In-
cluded mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values for payouts and M&A
2.5.3 Difference-in-differences results
The use of difference-in-differences approach is based on the exogeneity of the mutual
fund scandal that took place in September 2003 and involved 25 mutual fund families. These
funds were reported to be involved in trading malpractices during the after-market hours.
After the scandal broke-out, during 2003 - 2005 these funds lost over 25% of their net assets.
It was associated with a decrease in the density of common ownership, especially in the
industries with the highest ownership concentration of these involved mutual funds. For
the purpose of the difference-in-differences analysis, the ’treated’ group is defined as all the
firms in the industries with the highest ownership concentration of the mutual funds that
were involved in the scandal. It is therefore expected that the ’treated’ group after the
time of treatment exhibits the impact of reduced common ownership concentration, so that
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estimated coefficients are opposite to those from the baseline results. Analysis was conducted
using matched sample and was limited to years 2002 - 2005, which was the interval around
the time of the event.
Table 2.8: DID analysis results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Payouts Dividends Buybacks Markup Capex M&A DCO
Treatedj · Postt -13.912*** -3.452*** -10.460*** -0.540 1.046* -1.149 -0.034***
(-12.18) (-7.53) (-10.49) (-0.11) (1.66) (-0.93) (-2.64)
Postt 3.139*** 0.638*** 2.502*** 2.152** 0.567*** 1.747*** 0.028***
(12.19) (6.17) (11.13) (1.99) (3.99) (6.12) (9.64)
Treatedj 19.117*** 3.901*** 15.216*** 12.102 -2.050* 4.726** -0.120***

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7,707 7,707 7,707 7,707 7,691 7,505 7,707
R2 0.491 0.649 0.447 0.276 0.597 0.184 0.727
Covariates are Inst own, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1,
HHI. Fixed effects included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market
capitalization. Sample is limited to years 2002 - 2005. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics for positive values.
Coefficients of DCO in the panel DID model have signs that are opposite to those of DCO
in the baseline models. From table 2.8 column 7 one observes that the mutual fund scandal
was associated with a decrease in DCO of about 1/5 standard deviations. Such impact
of the ’treatment’ by the exogenous variation is negative for payouts, buybacks, mark-ups,
acquisitions and DCO; the impact of ’treatment’ is positive on capital investments. In other
words, lower common ownership concentration is associated with increased competition,
lower payouts and M&A investments, and higher capital investments. This ’natural event’
was associated with the decreased common ownership and it exhibits impact that is opposite
to that of the DCO in the baseline model. Such findings are in line with the suggested
framework of the common ownership concentration effect on payouts and investments.
Placebo test was performed to evaluate robustness of this DID analysis. Specifically,
false ’scandal’ time was used instead of correct one, to explore whether the results are not
due to some systematic difference between the treated and control group of firms. In the
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obtained placebo test results, none of the difference-in-differences coefficients was significant
(Appendix A.6 ).
2.5.4 Robustness checks
Several robustness checks were performed in order to evaluate consistency of the obtained
results with respect to different analysis set-ups. Specifically, robustness checks consider rel-
evance of different alternative measures of common ownership concentration (DCO, PCF
and PCS), and evaluate results across different time sub-periods (2000-2005, 2006-2011 and
2012-2017). Ideally, the results would remain consistent across all the considered specifica-
tions.
Dynamics of the considered three measures of common ownership concentration is pre-
sented in the following figures. While DCO and PCS have different levels, their change over
time shows similar trends, piques and troughs. Unlike DCO and PCS, PCF has a different
dynamics, it shows much higher volatility, especially in 2008-2010 during the global financial
crisis.
Figure 2.5: Dynamics of density of common ownership
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Figure 2.6: Dynamics of percentage of common funds
Figure 2.7: Dynamics of percentage of common stocks
Estimation of the baseline model for payouts with each of the three measures of common
ownership concentration is summarized in table 2.9. The effect of all three measures of
common ownership concentration is qualitatively similar, as for each measure positive effect
of higher common ownership concentration is evidenced. The effect of PCF on buybacks is
not statistically significant, presumably due to high volatility of PCF especially during the
crisis years.
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Table 2.9: Effect of different measures of common ownership on buybacks
Common ownership measures:
DCO PCF PCS
Common ownership conc. 0.582*** 0.342 0.582***
(2.91) (0.21) (5.01)







Covariates yes yes yes
Indus. FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
No. obs 78,487 78,487 78,487
R2 0.387 0.387 0.387
Dependent variable is Buybacks/ Total assets. Common ownership measures: DCO - density of common
ownership, PCF - percentage of common funds, PCS - percentage of common stocks. Fixed effects
included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market capitalization. t-
statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
The following test explores whether the results are preserved for different time sub-
periods: 2000 - 2005, 2005-2012, and 2013 - 2017. Although these sub-periods are of similar
length, they are qualitatively different. Specifically, there was dot-com crisis in 2000-2005
along with the mentioned exogenous shock to the mutual fund industry. During 2006 - 2012
there was the global financial crisis. As common owners strived to increase shareholder value
they would reduce payouts during the times of crisis in order to improve liquidity and avoid
cash deficits. To allow for the differences in the nature of each sub-period, an interaction
term was added between DCO and a dummy for negative net income. After controlling for
time-specific and firm-specific situation, DCO has positive sign in its effect on net buybacks
in each of the considered three periods.
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Table 2.10: Effect of common ownership on buybacks by sub-period
Sub-periods:
2000-17 2000-05 2006-11 2012-17
DCO 0.073* 0.239*** 0.042 0.357***
(1.68) (3.18) (0.52) (4.45)
DCO · IIncome<0 -0.101 -0.313* -0.949*** 0.567**











Covariates yes yes yes yes
Indus. FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
No. obs 77,508 26,378 27,107 24,023
R2 0.384 0.427 0.370 0.452
Dependent variable is Buybacks/ Total assets. DCO - density of common ownership. Fixed effects
included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market capitalization. t-
statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
2.6 Tests of the Mechanism
A number of conceptual tests were performed to further evaluate relevance of the con-
sidered mechanism regarding the common ownership concentration effect on competition.
In relation to this, external competition that is not under control of the common owners
is taken into account by considering ’China shock’ (sub-section 2.6.1). It is hypothesized
that under external competition that is not under control of, and that cannot be reduced
by common owners, the effect on payouts should be substantially lower than in the baseline
analysis. Also, the effect of common ownership on payouts and other outcomes is explored
in relation to the ’traditional’ market concentration using Herfindahl (sub-section 2.6.2). It
is hypothesized that in the case of unconcentrated industries, the ability of common owners
to reduce competition, increase payouts and facilitate consolidation should be higher that in
case of concentrated industries.
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2.6.1 Relevance of import competition
The import competition test includes interaction of the density of common ownership
with indicator for high China shock. The rationale is that in the industries with high
prevalence of imports, competition cannot be lowered by the common owners of the US
firms, as the US firms even when commonly owned must still compete with their foreign
peers. Among the prior researchers, Acemoglu et al. (2016) showed relevance of import
competition for development of the US economy and argued that import competition has
seen a surge since 2000 causing job losses to the US of about 2.0-2.4 million. Moreover,
Pierce and Schott (2016) also explored the decline in manufacturing employment that took
place after 2000.
Current paper follows the approach in Pierce and Schott (2016) for measurement of the
exposure to China import shock on the industry-level. This approach relies on the exogenous
change in the import tariffs on Chinese goods, due to the US Congress granting Chinese goods
with the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) regime in 2001, in relation to China
accessing the WTO. This marked decline in the US import tariffs on Chinese goods across
broad categories of industries. Pierce and Schott (2016) indicate the shock impact was to
lower the manufacturing employment by 18% during 2000 - 2007, while it was approximately
unchanged at 18 million during 1965 - 2000. Following the considered approach, variable
‘NTR gap’ is used as exogenous time-invariant industry-level proxy for the China shock.
The variable shows the difference between non-NTR and PNTR import tariff rates. Where
non-NTR rates are those that would be used if PNTR status was not granted (Pierce and
Schott 2016)12.
NTR Gapj = non NTR ratej −NTR ratej (7)
Considering for the China shock is helpful to test in several ways the anti-competitive
hypothesis in relation to the common ownership concentration. One way is to directly test
whether higher exposure to non-controlled competition can lower the ability of common
owners to increase payouts and reduce investments. Moreover, the ‘China shock’ helps to
12In fact, Pierce and Schott (2016) indicate that since 1980 till 2000, the US applied special procedure
towards setting import tariffs for Chinese goods. This required annual re-consideration of whether NTR
should or should not be provided. This was still accompanied by significant uncertainty. Removal of this
uncertainty was argued to give rise to the ‘China shock’ since after 2001.
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evaluate the link between common ownership and payouts is exclusively due to institutional
investors being attracted towards companies with higher payouts.
The major hypothesis of the study is that common ownership concentration causes in-
crease in total payouts, which occurs alongside lower industry competition as common owners
aim to mitigating the free cash flow problem. Analysis in this section evaluates the abil-
ity of import competition to lower the anti-competitive effect of common ownership. This
effect, if confirmed empirically, would provide further evidence in favor of the considered
anti-competitive effect of common ownership.
Table 2.11: Panel results by ‘China shock’ effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Div Net BB Markup Capex M&A
DCO 5.897*** 0.625*** 5.408*** 7.446 0.380 -0.588
(10.87) (3.78) (11.61) (1.52) (1.61) (-1.04)
DCO ·High CS -2.567*** -1.103*** -1.754** 5.061 -0.370 2.545***

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 9,477 9,477 9,477 9,477 9,446 9,173
Industries (SIC3) 80 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.646 0.830 0.564 0.111 0.812 0.195
Each regression includes DCO, interaction of DCO and High CS (dummy for high ‘China shock’), High
CS dummy and continuous CS variable. Dividends, Buybacks, Capex and M&A are scaled by total
assets. DCO is density of common ownership. Fixed effects included for SIC3 industries and years. Re-
gressions are weighted using total market capitalization. Other covariates: Size, Leverage, Net Income,
Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. t-statistics in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The analysis is performed using matched sample
and industries that are exposed to the China shock
Results from the China shock indicate that positive effect of common ownership on pay-
outs is significantly reduced in the industries with high exposure to the China shock. Also
China shock shows high relevance for the effect of common ownership concentration on M&A
investment. The latter is in line with findings by Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) who indi-
cate that firms, which survived under China shock are those highly competitive ones with
solid financial performance. Common owners are thus able to facilitate industry consolida-
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tion, presumably in order to boost higher competitiveness in the sectors that are exposed
to imports. The effect of common ownership concentration on markups and capital invest-
ments are insignificant. There is difference in sample composition between these findings
for China shock effect and the baseline results. While the baseline results are obtained for
the total sample, the ’China shock’ findings are obtained for a subset of industries mainly
manufacturing, retail and wholesale sectors that involve tradable goods.
The results from analysis of the China shock interaction with DCO is in line with the
considered hypothesis about the anti-competitive effect of common ownership. Under higher
external competition, common owners prefer to decrease withdrawal of free cash flow from
the firms. Instead of higher payouts, common owners tend to facilitate more active M&A
investments in the industries that are exposed to the China imports. Industries that have
higher consolidation are able to rip economies of scale and are more capable of withstanding
international competition. Such impact by common ownership can be associated with higher
profitability, yet the effect of DCO · High CS on Markup is positive but not statistically
significant. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) mention that the firms that remain in the indus-
tries with high imports competition are more profitable, innovative and more competitive.
Similar findings as those in the table above, are provided in wide format. The wide format
results, instead of the DCO interaction with the Chinese shock, provide the effect of DCO
on the outcome variables by sub-sample of industries with low and high China shock. These
results are provided in Appendix A.7.
2.6.2 Relevance of industry concentration
Industries differ from each other by their level of market concentration and competition.
While some industries include only several players that control the entire market, others
may have hundreds of participants that compete intensively with each other. The effect of
common ownership concentration on firms in a given industry could differ conditional on the
level of market concentration (Herfindahl index) in that industry. In a highly concentrated
industry with only few players, competition may already be at a low level, as firms in this
may already lack incentives to compete with each other. Increase in common ownership
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concentration might not be able to result in any further decline in competition in such an
industry. Conversely, in an industry with high number of players, each of whom has a
low market power, increase in common ownership concentration could facilitate a decline in
competition much faster and easier. Analysis in this subsection addresses the hypothesis that
higher density of common ownership has greater impact on payouts and on other relevant
outcomes, such as capital investments, M&A activity, and markups, in industries with low
concentration (Herfindahl index). This is the second test of the mechanism, which aims to
additionally validate the relevance of common ownership concentration for payouts via its
implications for competition.
For testing the above mentioned hypothesis, an indicator variables, Low HHI was con-
structed. Industries (markets) with low concentration have HHI ≤ 1,500), while industries
(markets) with HHI ≥ 2,500 are defined as highly concentrated ones 13.
Table 2.12: Panel results and industry concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Div Net BB Markup Capex M&A
DCO 1.005*** 0.413*** 0.530*** -0.610 -0.673*** 0.567**
(4.71) (5.61) (2.92) (-0.15) (-3.18) (2.19)
DCO · IHHI≤1500 0.124 0.176 0.087 22.892*** -0.826** 1.624***
(0.32) (1.30) (0.26) (3.04) (-2.12) (3.46)
IHHI≤1500 -2.709*** -0.437*** -2.133*** -4.210 -0.943*** 1.328***

















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 63,573 63,573 63,573 63,573 63,314 61,670
Industries (SIC3) 244 244 244 244 244 244
R2 0.575 0.679 0.520 0.040 0.399 0.146
The model includes IHHI≤1500, interaction of DCO and IHHI≤1500. Dependent variables - Dividends, Buybacks,
Capex and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO - density of common ownership. Fixed effects included for
SIC3 industries and years. Regression weights - Total market value. Covariates: Inst own, Size, Leverage,
Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. t-statistics in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics for positive values
13The US Department of Justice (2018) indicates the two mentioned benchmarks that are used in its
activities, as well as used by other relevant agencies. An example of a typical use is in evaluation whether a
merger would cause excessive concentration of the market power.
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The results in table 2.12 indicate that all the effects of common ownership on payouts can
possibly be higher in the industries with lower concentration. Coefficient of the interaction
of DCO with IHHI≤1500 in the effect on payouts is positive but not statistically significant.
Additionally, the effect of DCO on markups is significantly higher, and its effect on capital
expenditures is significantly lower in industries with low concentration. Also, the impact of
DCO on M&A investments is considerably much higher in industries with low concentration.
All these effects are in line with the hypothesis that there is more room for common owners
to pursue consolidation in the industries with low concentration and high competition, as
opposed to the industries with high level of concentration. The obtained findings from
analysis of the effect of the interaction between common ownership and market concentration
serve to support the effect of common ownership towards lowering competition among firms.
The equivalent results in the wide format with the analysis performed by sub-samples are
provided in Appendix A.6.
2.7 Conclusion
The study evaluated the causal impact of common ownership concentration on corporate
payouts based on the mechanism that increased higher common ownership concentration
tends to lower competition among the firms. Analysis was based on the sample of over
11,000 listed US firms during 2000 - 2017. It implemented such identification strategies
as the use of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methodology, as well
as several tests of the mechanism and feasibility checks. As institutional investors jointly
increase their ownership shares in businesses within the same industry, it leads to higher
common ownership concentration. Such increase in common ownership concentration is
argued to reduce competition among the industry players. This is related to the interest of
common owners in pursuing policies, such as not fostering competition among the firms, in
order to promote the value of their shareholdings.
The key mechanism that is considered in this study is based on the presumed ability of
common ownership to lower competition in commonly owned industries. Decreased competi-
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tion is associated with higher market power of the market players, resulting higher markups,
lower capital investments, and increase in corporate payouts. The latter is rationalized by
the ability of common owners (institutional investors) to deal with the free cash flow agency
problem via fostering higher payouts. In addition to the main mechanism, several additional
links were considered that explain correlation between common ownership and corporate
payouts. For example, institutional investors can be attracted to the firms with generous
dividends and buybacks; or institutional investors per se can affect corporate payouts. Be-
sides, the increased cash flow of the firms in the industries with increased common ownership
is not necessarily used for making payouts, but it can also be used to finance acquisitions.
The current study obtained confirmation of the main considered mechanism and controlled
for the mentioned alternative explanations.
The study confirmed positive impact of common ownership concentration on corporate
payouts. Based on the results from matched sample, an increase in density of common
ownership by one standard deviation results in a 1 percentage point increase of the payouts
to assets ratio (1/15 of its standard deviation). Of this increase, 3/4 is due to the raise in
share buybacks and 1/4 comes from the dividends growth. This study also re-establishes
positive impact of common ownership on mark-ups and acquisitions, and its negative effect
on capital investments. These findings provide evidence in favor of the common ownership
concentration ability to lower competition to the benefit of common owners. The effect of
common ownership concentration was shown to be higher in magnitude for the commonly
owned firms, as opposed to the other firms in the same industry.
The study also performed two tests of the mechanism. Specifically, it explored whether
the common owners impact on corporate payouts, profitability, and investments changes un-
der increased import competition, as well as whether common ownership concentration has
different effect in industries with low concentration as opposed to those with high concentra-
tion. When industry is exposed to significant import competition, such source of competition
is not under control of the common owners. Thus, their impact on payouts and investments
is expected to be altered in such industries, in comparison to the baseline results. The ob-
tained results indicate that high import competition exposure lowers the positive impact of
common ownership on payouts and increases its positive impact on concentration among
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domestic suppliers via higher M&A investments. It was also confirmed that for industries
with low concentration (low Herfindahl) there is greater magnitude of the positive common
ownership effect on payouts, markups and acquisitions, as well as more pronounced negative
impact on capital investments.
The area of common ownership concentration is an expanding one and there are nu-
merous directions for future research. One aspect is that further analysis would benefit
from exploring implications of common ownership concentration for firms within the same
between-industries supply chains, opposed to the within-industry setup. Also, the use of
structural modeling could help to gain more insight into the implications of common own-
ership given the complex nature of the interaction between involved stakeholders. Besides,
currently there is no a compelling measure of common ownership concentration that could
be employed by regulators for purposes such as monitoring mergers and acquisitions. Specif-
ically, based on performed simulation analysis, all considered common ownership indicators
under certain conditions showed performance that was not in line with common sense reason-
ing. Development of a more compelling measure of common ownership is another promising
research venue.
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3.0 Wealth Implications and Causes of Gray Divorce
I estimate implications of ‘gray divorce’ for all components of wealth among those aged
50+. The essay uses semi-parametric difference-in-differences methodology, which compares
previously married individuals that become divorced to those who remained married. Match-
ing is used to ensure that both groups are similar on key lagged economic and demographic
characteristics. My results confirmed negative impact of gray divorce on net worth, especially
such components as housing equity and financial assets. There is no evidence of higher de-
cline in wealth among females as compared to males. However, divorcing females are shown
to experience greater decline in the value of their IRAs and stocks, and are more likely to
re-enter labor force. It was shown that negative wealth implications of gray divorce increased
with age among those 50+. The observed deterioration in wealth can be related to the costs
of the divorce process, loss of the economies of scale, as well as with deterioration of mental
ability due to loneliness. Wealth was shown to also be a key predictor of the probability of
gray divorce, as higher wealth lowers chances of gray divorce.
3.1 Introduction
Recent decades evidenced rapid expansion in divorce rates among the elderly, which
exceeded those of the younger cohorts. For the purpose of this study, ‘gray divorce’ is defined
as marital dissolution among a couple where one or both partners aged 50 or above. Such
definition was also used in Sharma (2015), Crowley (2018), and Brown and Wright (2017)
among others. The US population faces steady trend towards increasingly greater share of
the elderly in its structure. Those aged 50+ constitute over 1/3 of the total population,
according to the US Census. They also have the highest median savings among all other
population groups by age (Gilbert 2017). Thus, the possible negative impact of gray divorce
for household wealth could have considerable negative implications for the economy as a
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whole. Crowley (2018) mentions the so called economic and social penalties of gray divorce.
While earlier researchers did recognize the economic losses associated with divorce including
its impact on wealth, most prior studies were correlational and lacked a systematic empirical
analyses of marital dissolution implications for the wealth and economic well-being of the
elderly using an appropriate identification strategy. The current study relies on the use of
semi-parametric difference-in-differences methodology in order to isolate and estimate the
causal impact of gray divorce on wealth and wealth components of the household, including
its effect on total net worth, housing and non-housing wealth, different types of financial
assets, and on such related economic and well-being outcomes like cognitive ability, financial
and total income, and labor market participation. The study also explores the role of various
demographic, economic, and health-related factors for predicting probability of gray divorce
among those aged 50 and above.
The tendency towards increasing marital dissolution rates among the elderly is well
documented, as is negative implications of gray divorce for health and cognitive ability.
Stepler (2017) indicates that during 1990 - 2015 the divorce rates among those aging 50
and above have more than doubled, in comparison to its modest 14% increase for those aged
40-49 and to a 21% decline in divorce rates among the cohort of 25-39 year old. Prior studies
have also evidenced that divorces lead to increased loneliness and greater social exclusion
among the elderly (Del Bono et al. 2007). In its turn, feeling of loneliness was shown to have
adverse health and mental ability implications (DeLiema et al. 2018; Luo et al. 2012). For
the case of young cohorts, Gardner and Oswald (2006) showed that divorce increases the
level of happiness, especially for individuals who re-partnered soon after the divorce. But the
latter may be less relevant for the elderly, and is also evaluated in this analysis. The current
study explores the causal link between divorces of the elderly and its implications for their
wealth. Because the elderly rely heavily on their wealth to maintain stable consumption
level and quality of life, implications of gray divorce could be devastating for the economic
well-being of the senior population.
Quite a number of studies considered the effects of marital dissolution on economic and
financial well-being (e.g. Smock et al. 1999, Zagorsky 2005, DeLiema et al. 2018, Brown and
Wright 2017, Haider et al. 2003), although most of these studies pertained to the younger
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cohorts. Of these studies, Zagorsky (2005) explored the impact of divorce on net worth for
couples in their 20s, 30s and 40s using correlational analysis. Zagorsky (2005) concluded that
per person wealth of married individuals, on average, is 77 percent higher in comparison to
that of a single person. Meanwhile for divorced ones, there is an equal magnitude decline in
wealth. The result can be driven by econometric selection problem. Theoretical mechanisms
that explain faster wealth accumulation in married households include economies of scale and
specialization of partners in the marriage. On other hand, raising children, which is relevant
for younger couples but usually not for those aged 50+, requires expenses and this has a
negative marginal impact on wealth in married couples (Zagorsky 2005, Becker et al. 1977).
Many studies (e.g. Smock et al. 1999, Sharma 2015) indicated greater economic ‘penalty’
from a divorce for women as compared to men in relation to re-entering the job market.
These studies argued that, on average, women devoted much time to raising children, they
have lower work experience and education levels, which puts then in a disadvantage when re-
entering the job market. Haider et al. (2003) reports that among the elderly, single women
have the same labor force participation rate as married men. Also, due to the foregone
working experience that was instead foregone due to raising children, elderly women that
re-enter labor force, are paid less in comparison to elderly men, after controlling for the
level of education. Elderly individuals in a marital partnership provide social support and
care to one another. When a marriage is dissolved, such care-giving services are foregone,
leading to greater loneliness and lower mental ability. Mazzonna et al. (2018) indicates that
the lack of awareness about one’s own cognitive decline has negative financial implications,
due to ineffective disinvestment decisions and higher vulnerability to financial scam. The
current study builds on these mentioned mechanisms and tends to explore further divorce
implications of various aspects of wealth of the elderly. Despite growing research studying
gray divorce and its implications for the elderly, there is lack of a systematic causal evaluation
of the gray divorce implications for the wealth and its components. Therefore, the current
study aims to address this mentioned gap.
It is also important to understand the relevance of wealth along with relevant demo-
graphic and heath factors, to predict gray divorces. An additional component of this study
is the extended exploration of the relevance of various economic, demographic and health
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factors to predict divorces in the case of the elderly households, using machine learning
methodologies. Different factors of marital stability and divorces, in relation to a general
population rather than the ’gray’ cohort, were broadly covered in prior theoretical and em-
pirical literature. Becker et al. (1977) indicates relevance of marriage-specific assets to lower
the probability of divorce. Such assets include giving birth to children and devoting time to
non-market working. In relation to the marriage-specific assets mechanism, Stepler (2017)
reported higher divorce rates among individuals in their second and subsequent marriages,
which is due to a much lower level of marriage-specific assets in the second, third and so on
marriages. Prior empirical results (e.g. Crowley 2018; South and Spitze 1986) indicated rel-
evance of such factors as husband’s employment, wife’s labor force participation, race, home
ownership, age at marriage, and living in urban area. South and Spitze (1986) mentioned
a changing role of wife’s education that lowers probability of divorces in the early age, but
increases it in later life periods. The current study considers most of the mentioned determi-
nants and includes additional ones aiming to better predict divorce risks among those aged
50 and above. Anecdotal evidence, along with interview-based studies, indicate such reasons
for gray divorce may include spouses having grown apart, one of spouses having mental prob-
lems or unhealthy addiction, financial issues, physical cheating by a spouse, and domestic
abuse (Crowley 2018). Few prior empirical studies captured the effect of the ‘growing apart’
concept (in realms of religion, occupation change, physical attractiveness etc.) as a divorce
reason. Therefore, in the realm of forecasting gray divorces, the current study contributes
to the literature as it adds additional variables to capture differences between spouses, and
employs powerful models from the machine learning methodology.
In relation to the above discussion, the current study aims to address the following
research questions. First, how does gray divorce affect wealth and wealth components of
the household? Second, what are other economic and cognitive outcomes of the divorce in a
senior age? Third, what factors predict the marital dissolution among the elderly and does
wealth play a significant role in predicting gray divorces?
The remaining parts of the study are organized as follows: Chapter 2 details the method-
ological foundation of the study, including the data source, sample construction, variables
and descriptive statistics, as well as causal inference methodology. Chapter 3 presents the
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results of the estimated effects of gray divorce on wealth and its components, as well as
additional economic and well-being outcomes. Chapter 4 explores the predictability of gray
divorce in senior couples, including evaluation of economic, health and demographic deter-
minants. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study and lists its key findings.
3.2 Data, Sampling and Methodology
3.2.1 Data and sampling
Data was obtained from RAND Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) version 2016 release
2. The RAND version of HRS includes imputations for multiple income and asset-related
variables, ensuring greater comparability and completeness of information in the database
(Bugliari et al. 2020). The US-wide panel dataset covers individuals aged 50 and above.
For all married and partnered individuals the dataset provides all the relevant information
on their spouses. The data includes 13 waves of surveys and covers 7 cohorts of the US
population, totaling to 42,051 individuals from 26,598 households. Current study recognizes
that couples who get divorced and those who remain married can be systematically differ-
ent from each other (Appendix B.1 gives comparison of the summary statistics between the
two groups). Thus, the first part of the identification strategy implements propensity score
matching in order to select a similar household that remains married for each married house-
hold that divorces in the next period. For the purpose of this analysis a ’treated’ individual
is a one that was married during at least 2 recent waves and then becomes divorced for at
least 2 subsequent waves. A ’control’ individual is a one that was matched to the ’treated’
one and also was married for at least 2 waves prior to and 2 waves after the divorce of its
match.
3.2.2 Variables
A number of relevant wealth measures are included into the analysis. The key gen-
eral measures of wealth are total net worth, housing equity, non-housing wealth, and total
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financial assets. These measures and their construction are summarized in the table 1
Table 3.1: The key wealth variables
Indicator Components
1 Net worth
All housing and non-housing assets less
all mortgages and other debts
2 Housing equity
Sum of primary and secondary residence
less related mortgages and home loans
3 Non-housing wealth Net worth less Housing equity
4 Financial assets
Stocks, bank accounts, CDs, bonds,
other financial assets
In addition to the wealth variables, this study explored such economic and well-being
outcomes as happiness status, retirement, labor force participation, total earnings, cogni-
tive score, and memory test score. Variable ’happiness status’ is used for the purpose of
comparing the current study results for the elderly to the findings of Gardner and Oswald
(2006) in case of the younger cohorts. The control variables in this study include household
size, the respondent’s age, gender, race and religion, time and cohort dummies. All wealth
measures, such as net worth or financial assets, are available on ’per household’ basis from
the RAND HRS 2018. To transform those into a ’per person’ basis, square root equivalence
scale was applied, according to the approach in OECD (2011). The use of equivalence scales
is required for comparison of well-being across households of different number of household
members, and this relates to the possibility of under-aged individuals in the household, and
to account for any economies of scale and cost saving opportunities (Rojas 2014). Under the
square root equivalence scale, a ’per person’ estimate is obtained by dividing the per house-
hold value by square root of the number of people residing in the household. This approach
was preferred to other alternatives (e.g. OECD equivalence scale assigns weight of 1.0 to
head of household, 0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 to a child under 18), because the
HRS provides information about household size, but does not decompose into the number
of under-age children and adults.
1Using HRS codes (Bugliari et al. 2020):
 Net worth = ahous +arles +atran +absns +aira +astck +achck +acd +abond +aothr -amort -ahmln
-adebt
 Housing equity = hatoth + hanethb
 Non-housing wealth = arles +atran +absns +aira +astck +achck +acd +abond +aothr -adebt
 Financial assets = astck +achck +acd +abond +aothr
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3.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Causal analysis is based on the matched sample, wich was obtained by retaining all
’treated’ individuals and by selecting a ’control’ individual for each ’treated’ one. The
matching was performed in a way that ensures similarity between ’treated’ and ’control’
individuals in all relevant respects, including net worth, income, age, number of household
members, education, in the periods that precede the gray divorce of the ’treated’. Descriptive
statistics for this matched sample is provided in the table below, indicating central tendency




Table 3.2: Matched sample balance evaluation
Divorced Married
Mean SD Mean SD Difference t-stat p-val
Non-white, % 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.07 0.94
Protestant, % 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 -0.01 -0.29 0.77
Catholic, % 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.93 0.35
Age, years 59.32 8.87 59.25 8.90 0.07 0.11 0.91
HH sizet−1 2.67 1.04 2.77 1.38 -0.11 -1.14 0.25
Total incomet−1 59300.70 48210.68 52450.32 55516.94 6850.38 1.73 0.08
Capital incomet−1 8420.71 20476.63 7817.01 28049.96 603.70 0.32 0.75
Net wortht−1 269495.97 764840.26 204443.27 395954.02 65052.70 1.40 0.16
Hous. wealtht−1 161120.37 437961.84 131537.32 332666.36 29583.05 1.00 0.32
Fin. wealtht−1 70892.86 339371.10 53626.63 218501.41 17266.23 0.79 0.43
Stockst−1 48322.12 316011.38 25726.58 120940.83 22595.53 1.24 0.22
Bondst−1 2136.63 22646.26 3243.73 35144.70 -1107.10 -0.49 0.62
Bank accst−1 19975.99 67624.21 14383.29 64862.38 5592.70 1.11 0.27
CDst−1 4481.40 17214.02 7365.85 35932.51 -2884.45 -1.34 0.18
V ehiclest−1 14118.17 16331.78 12913.56 14384.49 1204.61 1.03 0.31
IRAt−1 31593.49 109791.09 32275.55 104291.55 -682.06 -0.08 0.93
All income and wealth variables are in per equivalent person basis in logarithms. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
The results indicate that housing wealth comprise about 60 % of total net worth per individual. Among financial assets,
stocks is the largest category (68 % of financial wealth) followed by IRA as the second largest (45 %) and bank accounts as the
third largest (28 %) 2. Comparison is performed in the wave that preceded the time when ’treated’ individuals appeared divorced
for the first time. While the matched sample does not evidence any significant differences between the treated and control subsets
in the period before the divorce, the original sample contains significant differences between these groups (Appendix B).
2The sum of the weights for stocks, IRAs and bank accounts add up to over 100% because ’financial wealth’ is composed of the mentioned
components less ’Other debt’
Structure of the household assets for the ’treated’ group of households is shown in the
figures below. The top row of Figure 3.1 shows the weighted average structure of total assets
and financial assets for the ’treated’ households. The bottom row of Figure 3.1 indicates the
simple average structure of total assets and financial assets, respectively. While the weighted
average indicates the categories where the most wealth is stored, the bottom row shows the
most typical structure for the considered households. All the results are provided for the
time period when ’gray divorce’ was observed for the first time for the ’treated’ households.
Figure 3.1: Structure of total assets and mean structure of assets
Note: Top row shows weighted average structure of each category for the ’treated’. Bottom shows mean
structure of each category for the ’treated’ . All data is provided as of the year of ’Gray divorce’
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3.2.4 Methodology
3.2.4.1 Difference-in-differences The method of difference-in-differences (DID) is a
panel data estimation methodology that aims to isolate pre-treatment differences between the
two groups, as well as any common trends in the dependent variable, and thus estimate the
treatment effect (Taddy 2019). The following regression version of difference-in-differences
captures the effect of gray divorce on wealth from the coefficient of the interaction between
treated dummy and the post-treatment time dummy.
Yit = α + γDdiv + λDtime + δDdivDtime + βXit + εit (8)
Coefficient δ in the model above shows the difference between the mean change in the
outcome variable after the divorce for the ’treated’ groups and mean change for the ’control’
group over the same time (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
The difference-in-differences method assumes that without treatment, both groups would
evidence parallel time trend. If this assumption does not hold, the obtained DID estimator
could involve a bias. Matching of the sample was performed based on lagged indicators of
wealth and income for the past two periods, thus aiming to artificially ensure the parallel
trends between both groups. Furthermore, including vector of demographic characteristics
X is called to further eliminate differences between the groups and to decrease standard
errors of the estimated DID coefficient δ.
3.2.4.2 Event study This method is also referred to as a difference-in-differences lead-
lag analysis, or dynamic DID (Gardner and Oswald 2006). The event study DID focuses
on changes in the outcome variable in multiple periods before and after the event of gray
divorce. The regression approach is based on the following equation, where, τ indicates
specific period around the time when treated individual becomes divorced; other variables
are used in the same meaning as mentioned previously.
Yit = α + Σ
n
τ=−nδτDdiv + βXit + εit (9)
Event study DID is useful as it allows exploration of change over multiple periods around
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the time when ’treated’ individuals become divorced. This is useful in order to explore
whether certain changes persist into the long-run, or whether they start with the ’gray’
divorce but then vanish over the several years afterwards. For example, as is evidenced in
this study, happiness decreases in the years right before the divorce but then it exhibits
renewal after the divorce 3.
The lead-lag relation between the divorce and net worth is also explored graphically, by
plotting conditional mean levels of net worth (along with the standard errors) for the ’treated’
and ’counterfactual’ groups over the time around the event time of turning divorced. In this
case, ’counterfactual’ was obtained as the fitted values from the model by assuming that the
’gray’ divorce did not take place.
3.2.4.3 Propensity score matching As was previously mentioned, propensity score
matching (PSM) was used for construction of the sample for the subsequent causal analysis.
Matching is a procedure to select observations into the control group with the goal of ensur-
ing that they are similar to those in the treated group in all important respects other than
the treatment (i.e. ’gray divorce’). Ho et al. (2007a) indicates that propensity score match-
ing strives to summarize all the explanatory variables (matching variables) with a single
’propensity score’ variable, which is estimated for each individual as a probability of being
selected into the treated group. Thus, implementation of PSM-based sample construction
involves two steps. On the first step, a probability of assignment into the treated group is
estimated for each individual in the sample. On the second step, the best match is selected
for each ’treated’ observation using the nearest neighbor method (Angrist and Pischke 2009,
Ho et al. 2007b). The main limitation of the PSM methodology is that the list of matching
variables may omit certain vital variables that are not be observed. Additionally, there can
be narrow support problem, when there is lack of overlap by the propensity scores distri-
bution between the treated and control groups. This was not the problem for the current
analysis. The size of the pool for selection of ’control’ observations was many times larger as
the pool of the ’treated’ observations, and there was significant overlap by propensity scores.
3In case of Gardner and Oswald (2006) who studies the effect of divorces among younger cohorts, the
result was somewhat different. Gardner and Oswald (2006) found that happiness after the divorce came to
a higher level as compared to its level before the divorce
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3.3 Findings
The obtained causal inference results are organized in several tables and plots. First, the
baseline DID results are presented in table 3.3. Then detailed DID results are exhibited with
using detailed wealth outcomes that are organized for sub-samples by gender, age group, and
income level (tables 3.4 and 3.5 - for intensive and extensive margins). Third, findings from
event study DID are provided to evaluate the dynamic of wealth changes around the divorce
event (table 3.6, and figures 3.2 - 3.3). Fourth, impact of gray divorce on additional economic
and well-being outcomes was explored (table 3.7). Finally, feasibility testing of the results
is performed by considering the effect of outliers, as well as by exploring whether the results
remain unchanged when the sample is sub-divided by respondent cohort and wave of the
survey (table 3.8).
3.3.1 Impact of gray divorce using DID
The basis DID results are provided in the next table, which are the basic results for
evaluation of the gray divorce effect on individual wealth and wealth components. The
results provide estimates for the lasting effect, as opposed to the temporal effects evidenced
with the event study DID. The baseline results involve the following four key measures of
wealth: net worth, housing equity, non-housing wealth and total financial assets. If ’gray
divorce’ has a lasting negative impact on individual wealth, it would be captured by a
negative and significant DID coefficient. There are negative and significant coefficients for
housing equity and financial assets per person. These indicate that financial assets and
housing equity decline and do not subsequently restore following the ’gray’ divorce. For
the net worth there is negative but insignificant coefficient of -0.022 (similar result that is
negative but not significant is observed for the self-reported happiness status). This indicates
that total net worth per person does not get significantly affected by gray divorce in the long
run. Yet net worth can still experience decline right following the divorce, which is further
explored using the event study DID approach.
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Table 3.3: Baseline DID results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net worth Housing eq. Non-hous. eq. Fin. assets Happy
DtrDtime -0.022 -0.104*** -0.003 -0.925*** -0.021
(-1.401) (-4.998) (-0.183) (-4.023) (-0.867)
Dtr 0.003 0.034* -0.002 0.003 -0.061***
(0.180) (1.683) (-0.180) (0.013) (-2.859)
Dtime 0.007 0.048** -0.000 0.137 0.020
(0.799) (2.204) (-0.036) (0.660) (1.001)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.035** 0.001
(1.546) (0.743) (1.518) (2.090) (0.534)
Female -0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.056 -0.006
(-0.065) (0.853) (-0.213) (0.256) (-0.308)
Constant 14.296*** 12.604*** 14.294*** 5.971* 0.694***
(227.715) (161.808) (278.715) (1.730) (3.504)
Observations 7,012 7,012 7,012 7,012 6,285
R-squared 0.051 0.062 0.038 0.213 0.019
All dependent variables, except ’Happy’ are in per equivalent person basis in logarithms. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
After the negative implications of gray divorce on housing wealth and financial assets
was established from the above set of results, the following two tables provide in-depth
exploration of wealth categories (these vary across table rows) for total sample and for sub-
sets obtained from grouping by gender, age and income level (samples vary by columns).
Such approach is helpful in determining the cohorts that experience the heaviest decline in
the value of certain wealth categories. While table 3.4 provide the results using intensive
margin of the dependent variables, the findings for extensive margin are summarized in table
3.5.
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Table 3.4: DID results by detailed outcomes: Intensive margin




Male Female Age ≤ 60 Age > 60 Low inc. High inc.
Happy -0.021 -0.01 -0.025 -0.041 -0.049 -0.004 -0.029
(-0.867) (-0.273) (-0.849) (-1.14) (-1.342) (-0.122) (-0.826)
Net worth -0.022 -0.018 -0.026 -0.045** -0.005 0.009 -0.047***
(-1.401) (-1.099) (-1.113) (-2.139) (-0.229) (0.395) (-2.791)
Housing eq. -0.104*** -0.121*** -0.092*** -0.179*** -0.06*** -0.069** -0.124***
(-4.998) (-3.141) (-4.328) (-3.359) (-2.606) (-2.4) (-4.953)
Non-hous. eq. -0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.015 0.007 0.018 -0.02
(-0.183) (0.146) (-0.339) (-0.879) (0.313) (0.811) (-1.517)
Fin. assets -0.925*** -1.139*** -0.894*** -1.015*** -0.726** -0.213 -1.487***
(-4.023) (-3.25) (-2.998) (-2.61) (-2.022) (-0.698) (-4.368)
Vehicles -1.39*** -1.248*** -1.48*** -1.103*** -2.24*** -1.295*** -1.497***
(-6.642) (-4.026) (-5.345) (-3.566) (-7.268) (-5.033) (-5.136)
Businesses -0.141** -0.008 -0.239*** -0.045 -0.23** -0.143 -0.157*
(-2.156) (-0.095) (-2.595) (-0.504) (-2.323) (-1.532) (-1.845)
IRAs -0.877** -0.57 -1.094*** -0.353 -1.056** -1.371*** -0.646
(-2.528) (-0.949) (-2.621) (-0.607) (-2.148) (-2.612) (-1.463)
Stocks -0.788*** -0.647 -0.982*** -1.022** -0.733** -0.464 -1.154***
(-2.934) (-1.543) (-2.857) (-2.142) (-2.014) (-1.144) (-3.083)
Bank accs. -0.84*** -0.996*** -0.83*** -0.589 -0.829** -0.229 -1.273***
(-3.982) (-2.99) (-3.072) (-1.627) (-2.552) (-0.833) (-4.164)
CDs -0.454** -0.484 -0.521** -0.443 -0.061 -0.45 -0.334
(-2.092) (-1.333) (-1.994) (-1.23) (-0.215) (-1.459) (-1.169)
Bonds -0.078 -0.004 -0.147 -0.061 -0.035 -0.093 -0.059
(-0.583) (-0.016) (-0.945) (-0.305) (-0.195) (-0.448) (-0.347)
Other assets -0.107 -0.204 -0.103 -0.209 -0.115 -0.311 -0.222
(-0.561) (-0.725) (-0.406) (-0.675) (-0.388) (-0.946) (-0.883)
Other debt -0.094 -0.389 0.122 0.358 -0.121 -0.62 0.179
(-0.373) (-0.99) (0.374) (0.899) (-0.303) (-1.547) (0.547)
Each number is a Difference-in-differences coefficient from a separate regression (with control variables,
time and cohort fixed effects). All dependent variables, except ’Happy’ are in per equivalent person
basis in logarithms. Columns show considered sub-set, rows indicate outcome variables. T-statistics are
provided in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
’Gray’ divorce has lasting negative impact on net worth in case of mid-aged individuals
(age ≤ 60 ) and in case of high income individuals 4. The negative effect on Housing equity
is significant in the total sample and each category. The magnitude of the coefficient is the
smallest for those in senior years (Age > 60) and those in the low-income category. The effect
on vehicles and in businesses indicates significant decline in the case of women and those
aged 60+. The gray divorce-induced decline in financial assets is the largest for high-income
individuals, for males and those aged below 60. Among all the financial assets, it is bank
account and stocks that experience the most pronounced decline. In the case with stocks,
4Low and High income categories are those, respectively, below and above the median earnings income
for the treated category of $4,900
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the decline is higher for females, individuals aged below 60, and those in the high-income
group. In case with the bank accounts, the decline is also greater for those in the high-income
category. These results can be driven by the fact that low-income individuals most of the
time do not have any stocks. Non-housing equity, bonds, other assets and other debts are not
significantly impacted by ’gray’ divorce for either category. Individual retirement accounts
(IRA) exhibit significant decline in the total sample, and the most significant decline is
evidenced in the low income subset, as well as senior aged individuals and women.
Substantial proportion of individuals in the sample have zero holdings of certain types
of financial and other assets. Moreover, the proportion of those without assets and without
positive net worth tends to be higher after gray divorce. Specifically, after the ’gray’ divorce
13.7 % of ’treated’ individuals lost their positive net worth (8.4% did not have positive net
worth prior to the divorce), 28.5 % lost their positive housing equity (23.5% did not have
one), 14.8% lost financial assets (6.4% did not have it). Thus, addressing these consideration,
extensive margin DID analysis was performed and the results are provided in the following
table. The table is organized in a manner that is equivalent to the table with the intensive
margin results.All outcome variables were coded as a dummy variable that equals 1 for a
higher than zero value of the given wealth category and 0 otherwise. The estimated DID gray’
divorce coefficients when using extensive margin are negative and most of then are significant.
This indicates that gray divorce is frequently associated with the ’treated’ individuals loosing
their assets and wealth. The coefficients from the extensive margin analysis tend to have
higher statistical significance as compared to their counterparts from the intensive margin
analysis. For example, there is significant negative impact on net worth in the total sample
as well as in each sub-category (except the low-income group many of whom did not have
positive wealth before the divorce). This same reasoning explains the lack of significant
result for the low income group in case with stocks and bank accounts. Among various
wealth categories, the highest decline is evidenced for housing equity and vehicles. Gray
divorce seems to induce individuals to sell their vehicles, especially those aged 60+ and
those in high-income category. The strongest negative impact of gray divorce on IRAs is
for women, low-income group and those aged 60+. Therefore the elderly (aged 60+) and
women are the groups with the highest risk to loose their IRAs due to gray divorce. In case
53
with bonds, other assets and other debts, there is no evidence of a significant negative effect
of gray divorce using extensive margin.
Table 3.5: DID results by detailed outcomes: Extensive margin




Male Female Age ≤ 60 Age > 60 Low inc. High inc.
Net worth -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.062** -0.064*** -0.11*** -0.031 -0.083***
(-3.591) (-2.649) (-2.516) (-2.968) (-3.403) (-1.272) (-3.267)
Housing eq. -0.267*** -0.296*** -0.254*** -0.277*** -0.254*** -0.187*** -0.317***
(-8.456) (-6.342) (-5.963) (-5.332) (-5.407) (-4.37) (-7.067)
Non-hous. eq. -0.077*** -0.056* -0.092*** -0.068** -0.139*** -0.05* -0.102***
(-3.695) (-1.733) (-3.341) (-2.431) (-4.019) (-1.798) (-3.346)
Fin. assets -0.077*** -0.056* -0.092*** -0.068** -0.139*** -0.05* -0.102***
(-3.695) (-1.733) (-3.341) (-2.431) (-4.019) (-1.798) (-3.346)
Vehicles -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.121*** -0.198*** -0.102*** -0.147***
(-5.495) (-3.646) (-4.023) (-3.626) (-5.892) (-3.893) (-4.632)
Businesses -0.044** -0.031 -0.057** -0.024 -0.067** -0.057* -0.039
(-2.07) (-0.991) (-1.997) (-0.782) (-2.121) (-1.897) (-1.371)
IRAs -0.088*** -0.057 -0.109*** -0.041 -0.113** -0.134*** -0.07*
(-2.636) (-0.997) (-2.644) (-0.748) (-2.369) (-2.62) (-1.65)
Stocks -0.076*** -0.067* -0.092*** -0.096** -0.067* -0.051 -0.106***
(-2.889) (-1.653) (-2.655) (-2.161) (-1.86) (-1.261) (-2.941)
Bank accs -0.069*** -0.083** -0.062** -0.066* -0.062* -0.013 -0.117***
(-3.139) (-2.321) (-2.225) (-1.84) (-1.73) (-0.445) (-3.569)
CDs -0.057** -0.062 -0.063** -0.067* -0.014 -0.068* -0.039
(-2.341) (-1.532) (-2.172) (-1.689) (-0.41) (-1.856) (-1.274)
Bonds -0.009 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.008 -0.01 -0.008
(-0.64) (-0.195) (-0.876) (-0.225) (-0.424) (-0.482) (-0.465)
Other assets -0.015 -0.029 -0.013 -0.019 -0.019 -0.035 -0.031
(-0.77) (-0.984) (-0.492) (-0.572) (-0.588) (-0.979) (-1.168)
Other debt 0.006 -0.037 0.037 0.047 0.002 -0.053 0.034
(0.192) (-0.78) (0.965) (0.977) (0.036) (-1.097) (0.873)
Each number is a Difference-in-differences coefficient from a separate regression (with control variables,
time and cohort fixed effects). All dependent variables are dummies indicating whether the amount is a
positive number. Columns show sub-samples, rows indicate different outcome variables. T-statistics are
provided in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.3.2 Impact of gray divorce using event study
The above DID analysis indicated that in some cases there was no evidence of signifi-
cant lasting negative impact of gray divorce on wealth. For example, in total sample gray
divorce did not have significant negative impact on the amount of net worth. While the DID
method aims to identify a long-term result, event study DID aims to evaluate the effect in
different periods around the time of ’gray’ divorce. Visual evaluation using event study DID
is provided below for selected outcome variables, wile detailed regression-based event study
DID findings for each of the considered wealth categories are summarized in the table.
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Housing equity and financial assets tend to experience the greatest gap between the
divorced and their counterfactual. There is negative net worth outcome observed for the
divorced in comparison to the counterfactual, while non-housing wealth does not exhibit as
large a difference (figure 3.3).
For the purpose of comparison to the study by Gardner and Oswald (2006), dynamics of
happiness for the treated group and its counterfactual were explored as well. In line with the
results in Gardner and Oswald (2006), happiness achieved its lowest point in the period right
after the divorce, but then it revives in subsequent periods. Unlike the findings in Gardner
and Oswald (2006), which showed increase in the level of happiness after the divorce in case
of the younger groups, my findings only show that the level of happiness only revives to its
level that was observed prior to the ’gray’ divorce (figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Dynamics of feeling happy around gray divorce
Note: Divorced are ’treated’ individuals, while counterfactual are the predicted values from the dynamic
DID regression model assuming these are not ’treated’ individuals by setting Ddiv = 0
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Figure 3.3: Dynamics of net worth and asset categories around gray divorce
Note: Divorced are ’treated’ individuals, while counterfactual are the predicted values from the dynamic
DID regression model assuming these are not ’treated’ individuals by setting Ddiv = 0
56
Detailed dynamic DID results for each considered category of wealth are provided in table
3.6 below. For each outcome variable, the table provides a set of DID coefficients in every
time period within 4 waves before and 4 waves after the ’gray’ divorce event. Significant
and positive coefficients in the times prior to the time of ’gray’ divorce T combined with the
significant negative coefficients in the periods following the divorce suggest negative wealth
implications starting prior to the actual divorce 5. In case of net worth such pre-trends
can indicate that decline in wealth started somewhat prior to ’gray’ divorce. In case of the
happiness status, the pre-trend can be associated with higher levels of stress and decline in
happiness as the couple was already on its way to divorce. These pre-trends are evidenced
for such outcomes as net worth, housing equity, non-housing equity, vehicles and businesses,
as well as happiness status.
The dynamic DID coefficients are helpful for evaluation of timing of the decline in value
of various wealth components due to the divorce. Negative impact of gray divorce on net
worth is evidenced for the first three periods after the divorce (e.g. from T to T + 2).
Similar patterns of decline and subsequent revival were evidenced for businesses, stocks and
certificates of deposit (CDs). While in case of housing equity, vehicles, and financial assets,
and especially bank accounts and IRAs, negative effects are permanent and do not fully
recover.
5Matching was performed using only the first and second lags, but not higher order lags, of total income
and total assets. Thus some higher order lags are significant. Furthermore, as several variables were used for
matching, completely perfect match was not achieved in case of net worth and some pre-trend is evidenced
in the second lag of net worth. The level of happiness was not included as a matching variable.
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Table 3.6: Event study evaluation of gray divorce effect on wealth outcomes













DtrDT−4 -0.053 0.029 -0.058 -0.153 0.029 0.175** -0.516 0.255 -0.263 -0.613*** 0.063 -0.033
(-0.665) (1.364) (-0.727) (-0.563) (0.148) (2.068) (-1.474) (0.770) (-1.033) (-2.621) (0.367) (-1.008)
DtrDT−3 0.011 0.031* 0.006 -0.234 0.191 0.015 -0.455 -0.035 -0.225 -0.419** -0.094 -0.028
(0.945) (1.655) (0.582) (-0.954) (1.179) (0.273) (-1.465) (-0.127) (-0.989) (-2.040) (-0.755) (-0.982)
DtrDT−2 0.023** 0.014 0.021** 0.193 0.362** 0.044 -0.386 0.255 0.075 -0.107 0.013 -0.102***
(2.130) (0.934) (2.322) (0.904) (2.549) (0.855) (-1.315) (1.028) (0.366) (-0.538) (0.107) (-3.844)
DtrDT−1 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.027 0.284* 0.041 -0.521* 0.152 0.136 -0.128 -0.111 -0.109***
(1.087) (0.306) (1.007) (0.123) (1.843) (0.795) (-1.771) (0.597) (0.679) (-0.629) (-1.009) (-4.281)
DtrDT -0.018* -0.050*** -0.007 -0.962*** -1.025*** -0.097** -1.383*** -0.757*** -0.894*** -0.637*** -0.130 -0.150***
(-1.859) (-3.455) (-0.867) (-4.171) (-5.097) (-2.170) (-4.941) (-3.157) (-4.202) (-3.342) (-1.069) (-5.790)
DtrDT+1 -0.018* -0.057*** -0.006 -1.096*** -1.394*** -0.064 -1.457*** -0.930*** -0.923*** -0.462** -0.179 -0.088***
(-1.908) (-3.867) (-0.769) (-4.789) (-6.550) (-1.376) (-5.293) (-4.009) (-4.384) (-2.413) (-1.566) (-3.603)
DtrDT+2 -0.022** -0.056*** -0.011 -0.989*** -1.613*** -0.085** -1.372*** -0.726*** -0.723*** -0.564*** -0.069 -0.046**
(-2.348) (-4.166) (-1.269) (-4.251) (-7.254) (-2.266) (-4.927) (-3.047) (-3.427) (-3.150) (-0.559) (-1.967)
DtrDT+3 -0.012 -0.081*** 0.006 -0.695*** -1.108*** -0.062 -1.398*** -0.338 -0.693*** -0.249 -0.110 -0.079***
(-1.048) (-5.835) (0.584) (-2.782) (-4.621) (-1.283) (-4.663) (-1.277) (-2.931) (-1.238) (-0.919) (-2.957)
DtrDT+4 -0.010 -0.073*** 0.004 -0.591** -1.128*** -0.023 -0.958*** -0.273 -0.516** -0.268 0.147 -0.018
(-0.850) (-3.795) (0.388) (-2.153) (-4.228) (-0.389) (-2.841) (-0.923) (-2.047) (-1.217) (0.856) (-0.646)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave and
Cohort FE
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.053 0.060 0.040 0.214 0.107 0.016 0.087 0.101 0.168 0.054 0.041 0.024
All dependent variables, except ’Happy’ are in per equivalent person basis in logarithms. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of observations: 6,660.
3.3.3 Related well-being implications of gray divorce
Changes in wealth and its components due to gray divorce can be accompanied by changes
in other economic and well-being indicators. This section explores whether ’gray’ divorce
affected a number of such additional outcome variables, including labor force participation,
earnings income, capital income, and indicators of human capital, such as cognitive ability
and memory. Obtained dynamic DID estimates indicate that after ’gray’ divorce occurred,
about 11 - 12 % individuals quit their retirement to undertake some form of employment.
For this reason earnings income tends to increase among the ’treated’ individuals.
Table 3.7: Event study evaluation of gray divorce effect on selected outcomes











DtrDT−4 -0.015 0.002 -0.082 0.289 0.096 -0.046
(-0.183) (0.051) (-0.228) (0.882) (0.165) (-0.154)
DtrDT−3 0.059 0.010 0.100 -0.370 -0.596 -0.380
(0.840) (0.323) (0.313) (-1.330) (-1.109) (-1.476)
DtrDT−2 -0.025 0.028 0.075 0.243 -0.291 -0.181
(-0.431) (1.008) (0.263) (0.944) (-0.625) (-0.828)
DtrDT−1 0.051 0.012 0.089 -0.291 0.515 0.085
(0.831) (0.411) (0.307) (-1.154) (0.980) (0.393)
DtrDT 0.005 0.023 0.210 -1.025*** -0.488 -0.256
(0.090) (0.791) (0.718) (-4.239) (-1.149) (-1.268)
DtrDT+1 -0.097* 0.020 0.265 -1.139*** -0.755* -0.368*
(-1.870) (0.695) (0.929) (-4.890) (-1.730) (-1.868)
DtrDT+2 -0.098* 0.027 0.463 -1.093*** -1.262*** -0.568***
(-1.934) (0.954) (1.644) (-4.872) (-3.097) (-2.856)
DtrDT+3 -0.115** 0.048 0.519* -0.673*** -0.624 -0.142
(-2.251) (1.526) (1.651) (-2.695) (-1.462) (-0.665)
DtrDT+4 -0.075 0.033 0.463 -0.466 -0.258 -0.087
(-1.350) (0.943) (1.328) (-1.643) (-0.620) (-0.358)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave and Cohort FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 6,758 6,931 7,012 7,012 3,119 5,916
R-squared 0.103 0.212 0.198 0.098 0.192 0.175
All income variables are in logarithms. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
In addition, there is evidence of a significant decline in capital income, which can be
attributed to the previously reported depletion of financial assets among the divorced. Also
such decline of capital income can be due to decline in cognitive ability and memory after
the ’gray’ divorce. In other words, deterioration of mental capability due to ’gray’ divorce
may be an important source of subsequent wealth deterioration, as individuals tend to make
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ineffective investment decisions and are more prone to financial fraud. Such decline in mental
ability tends to be temporary and it vanishes three periods following the ’gray’ divorce. Hence
treated individuals would benefit by limiting their financial decision-making during the first
several years following their ’gray’ divorces, or preferably by seeking a professional financial
advice. The results in this part are in line with findings obtained by Mazzonna et al. (2018)
who studied wealth implications of mental ability decline among the elderly.
3.3.4 Feasibility tests
A number of feasibility tests were conducted to verify the findings. These evaluate
whether the obtained results are not completely driven by the outliers, and explore whether
the findings are similar across waves and cohorts. The feasibility tests results using total
financial assets as the outcome variable are shown below.
Table 3.8: Effect of gray divorce on financial assets: feasibility tests summary















DtrDT−4 -0.153 -0.117 -0.125 -0.104 -0.495 1.236**
(-0.563) (-0.449) (-0.484) (-0.395) (-1.644) (2.082)
DtrDT−3 -0.234 -0.167 -0.173 -0.153 -0.469 -0.389 0.263
(-0.954) (-0.638) (-0.665) (-0.582) (-0.768) (-1.386) (0.516)
DtrDT−2 0.193 0.437* 0.414* 0.448* -0.405 0.247 0.018
(0.904) (1.838) (1.769) (1.875) (-0.889) (1.046) (0.037)
DtrDT−1 0.027 -0.150 -0.147 -0.151 0.290 -0.056 0.263
(0.123) (-0.531) (-0.526) (-0.536) (0.791) (-0.224) (0.567)
DtrDT -0.962*** -0.717** -0.711** -0.719** -1.160*** -0.869*** -1.232***
(-4.171) (-2.178) (-2.176) (-2.181) (-3.400) (-3.290) (-2.641)
DtrDT+1 -1.096*** -1.034*** -1.017*** -1.036*** -1.118*** -1.048*** -1.311***
(-4.789) (-2.704) (-2.678) (-2.710) (-3.653) (-3.992) (-2.837)
DtrDT+2 -0.989*** -0.350 -0.327 -0.352 -1.250*** -1.049*** -0.888*
(-4.251) (-0.806) (-0.754) (-0.811) (-4.256) (-3.903) (-1.910)
DtrDT+3 -0.695*** -0.150 -0.150 -0.150 -0.905*** -0.686** -0.733
(-2.782) (-0.289) (-0.291) (-0.288) (-3.002) (-2.395) (-1.452)
DtrDT+4 -0.591** 0.407 0.410 0.402 -0.835*** -0.725** -0.140
(-2.153) (0.606) (0.616) (0.598) (-2.814) (-2.354) (-0.238)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave and
Cohort FEs
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. Obs. 7,012 3,537 3,537 3,537 3,475 5,391 1,621
R-squared 0.214 0.188 0.186 0.189 0.245 0.191 0.318
Dependent variable is log of financial assets per equivalent person. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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If the significant negative impact of ’gray divorce’ remains in all the considered feasibility
tests, this would contribute towards greater confidence in the obtained findings. To explore
the effect of outliers, the dependent variable was winsorized at 1% and 5% levels. All the
values outside of the mentioned cut-points (e.g. those below 1st and above 99th centiles with
1% winsorizing) were forced to equal the limiting values. Feasibility test results indicate
that the negative effect of gray divorce on financial assets is evidenced in each case after
the winsorizing. Moreover, the negative effect of ’gray’ divorce is evidenced in each category
by cohort and wave. Some differences are present though, as in the earlier waves ’gray’
divorce impact on financial wealth had somewhat lower magnitude and was shorter-lived in
comparison to the later waves.
3.4 Prediction of Marital Dissolution Among Elderly
3.4.1 Prediction analysis methodology
The goal of the section is to explore the role of different economic, demographic and
health variables to predict probability of divorce among mid- and senior-aged couples (aged
50+). Thus this study in addition to evaluating the effects of gray divorce on wealth, also
explores whether wealth and wealth components are significant predictors of divorce among
couples aged 50 and above. This subsection starts with the review of the key elements
of the forecasting machine learning methodology. Then the next two subsections provide
estimated results that describe the significance of the considered variables, and compare
predictive capability of different forecasting models.
3.4.1.1 Sample and features The sample for prediction analysis is constructed from
the same HRS panel dataset by retaining only those households that are married in the given
period and who either remain married or become divorced in the next period. There were
few same gender married individuals (less than 0.5% of the total sample) and these were
excluded from the analysis. The resulting sample includes 128,260 observations of which
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there are 1,697 those who divorced in the next period. The analysis in this section includes
the following predictive features (explanatory variables).
Table 3.9: Summary of features to predict gray divorces
Demographic Health Economic
Length of current marriage* Health* In labor force*
Age* BMI* Earnings*
Marriages* Depression* Pension*
Education* Smoke* Net worth
Persons in HH Drink* House equity
Children Lonely* Financial assets
Race* Happy*
Religion*
For each variable indicated in the table with ’*’ three values are included - value for the husband, wife,
and difference between the two.
The objective of the current section is to forecast gray divorce, the emphasis is on the
out-of-sample performance of the considered models. For this purpose the total sample
was randomly split into two - training part (80% of the sample) and testing part (20 %).
All predictive models that are detailed further, were estimated and their hyperparameters
(such as value of Lasso penalty parameter) were estimated using 5-fold cross validation.
According to Gareth et al. (2013), k-fold cross validation is a methodology to estimate a
predictive model and its hyper-parameters that is aimed to avoid over-fitting.
3.4.1.2 Predictive models This part performs prediction of the next marital status for
the currently married couples. This is expressed with the following general model.
P (y = 1|X) = F (X) = F (XDEM , XECON , XHEALTH) (10)
Predictive analysis in this section involves several models: regularized logistic regression,
classification tree, random forest, and artificial neural network. The models differ by func-
tional form and complexity of the predictive function F (X). Each of these models has its
advantages and limitations.
Logistic regression with a lasso regularization term is estimated using maximum likeli-
hood method with an objective function that includes the maximum likelihood of a plain lo-
gistic function with an additional regularization term, Lasso penalty term: −lnL+λΣPj=1|βj|
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(Gareth et al. 2013). There are alternatives to lasso regularization term, such as ridge regu-
larization term. Of the two terms, ridge has quadratic penalty form, while lasso has penalty
term in absolute value. In addition, third alternative is elastic net regularization that com-
bines both lasso and ridge penalties. Logistic regression is a linear model that can be
conveniently presented by indicating its marginal effects for all the explanatory coefficients.
Its limitations is lack of consideration for non-linear effects, lack of interaction among the
variables and relatively low forecast power as compared to other models.
Classification tree is another straightforward models that can be presented in a convenient
form graphically. Classification trees use features (explanatory variables) to sub-divide the
feature space into segments that are then classified based on the majority class in that
segment (Gareth et al. (2013)). Tree model is constructed by selecting regions that minimize
either Gini index or entropy measure (ibid). Classification tree is convenient for the use by
a human as it is straightforward to apply in practice. Yet, forecast performance of a single
classification tree is limited.
Finally, random forest and artificial neural network models are two highly non-linear
models, which have proven high performance in forecasting (Geron 2017). Of these, random
forest is a collection of classification tree models that generates majority vote from various
trees. Neural network model has a number of hidden layers with elements being forecasts
from models in the previous layer of the neural network. The main limitation of these two
models is that they technically are ’black boxes’ as each involves hundreds and thousands of
estimated coefficients that cannot be conveniently presented and interpreted.
3.4.1.3 Performance evaluation With the objective of providing effective forecast,
several indicators are used for forecast performance evaluation. These are recall, precision,
F1-score and accuracy, all are based on the confusion table. All these measured have domain
between zero and one, with high performance models approaching one.
Recall =
True positive
True positive+ False negative
Precision =
True positive






True positive+ True negative
Sample size
Hence, Recall shows the percentage of actual divorces that the model is able to correctly
classify. This is equivalent to one minus probability of type II error 6. Precision indicates
percent of correctly classified positive cases among all cases that are classified as positive by
the model. Therefore, Precision is equivalent to one minus probability of type I error. Also,
F1-score is a weighted average measure combining Recall and Precision. F1-score takes
higher values when both, Recall and Precision, are high. Accuracy simply indicates the
proportion of correctly classified cases by all cases that were classified by the model. When
the positive case is a rare in the dataset, relevance of Accuracy for evaluation of forecast
performance is low. In case when positive class is a rare one (proportion of newly divorced
individuals is below 1.5% in the data), of greater importance is the recall, precision and
F1-score, while relevance of accuracy is very low.
3.4.2 Estimated models results
The estimated logistic regression and classification tree models can be presented in a
compact form. The current section reports the estimated marginal effects from the Lasso
logistic regression, and the decision tree model, as well as feature importance analysis from
random forest. Then the following section compares predictive performance of these models
to conclude on their predictive power. Logistic regression with lasso penalty term was esti-
mated for the whole sample, as well as for the sub-samples: mid-aged (≤ 60 years) and senior
(over 60), low-income and high-income groups. The model included 55 features, the table be-
low presents selected features including all those that pertain to net worth and income, labor
force participation and human capital, and some selected demographic ones. The obtained
marginal effects indicate that net worth and housing equity are both significant predictors of
gray divorces and act to lower the probability of divorce. While net worth is highly relevant
for those in Low-income group, Housing equity is more relevant for households in the mid-age
6Type I error relates to a false positive classification, while Type II error indicates false negative classifi-
cation.
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category. Unlike the mentioned two wealth categories, financial assets are insignificant in
predicting gray divorces. There are other relevant features - female participation in labor
force has positive effect on the probability of divorce. Higher education of both spouses has
positive impact, while health and BMI have negative impact on the probability of divorce.
Higher number of children increases probability of divorce but to a minor extent. Number
of previous marriages, as well as feeling lonely, increases probability of the divorce, while
feeling happy for male is a predictor of a lower probability of ’gray’ divorce. When spouses
have the same religion, this decreases the probability of ’gray’ divorce, and being of same
race does not have any significance in predicting the divorce.
Decision tree results are provided on the next page. The tree is constructed in the way
that a reader can walk through the decision nodes from top to bottom, in order to determine
her predicted marital state in the next period. The tree was purposefully constrained to
have maximum length of four nodes in order to fit the page, and it is not the optimal design
for this model. Because of the mentioned constraint it is not the optimal classification tree
(optimal design that maximizes the forecast performance has the depth of 12 nodes). The
tree model shows high relevance for predicting probability of divorce of such variables as the
number of previous marriages for both spouses, feeling lonely, depressed and happy, health
and lifestyle related features (figure 3.4).
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Table 3.10: Marginal effects in predicting gray divorce: Logit model









Net worth -0.0056* -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0084* 0.0013
(-1.6728) (-0.1466) (-0.8316) (-1.8536) (0.2115)
Hous. eq. -0.0033* -0.0189** -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0083
(-1.8405) (-2.0293) (-0.5830) (-1.3267) (-1.0451)
Fin. assets 0.0043 -0.0009 0.0040 0.0028 -0.0022
(1.1414) (-0.1288) (0.7894) (0.3447) (-0.3331)
Lab. force M 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0027** -0.0009
(0.4628) (-0.1326) (1.2408) (2.5043) (-0.5354)
Lab. force F 0.0029*** 0.0037** 0.0015 0.0011 0.0047***
(3.2109) (2.3874) (1.5651) (1.0146) (2.8594)
Educ M 0.0003** 0.0004 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0002
(2.4099) (1.5047) (1.9906) (2.5480) (0.7711)
Educ F 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0006**
(2.9789) (2.9036) (1.1984) (1.7937) (2.3266)
Health M -0.0010*** -0.0019*** -0.0002 -0.0011** -0.0009
(-2.6487) (-2.9598) (-0.5758) (-2.5072) (-1.3916)
Health F -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0015*** 0.0011*
(-0.7951) (-1.3602) (0.5345) (-3.3347) (1.7295)
BMI M -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*
(-1.3658) (-1.3665) (-0.3252) (0.3803) (-1.8194)
BMI F -0.0001* -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.7085) (-2.3155) (0.6084) (-1.3790) (-1.0803)
Children 0.0007*** 0.0011*** 0.0003* 0.0007*** 0.0007**
(4.1213) (3.4841) (1.8233) (3.9406) (2.2391)
Same relig -0.0032*** -0.0032** -0.0027** -0.0034*** -0.0029**
(-3.5304) (-2.1568) (-2.5386) (-3.0351) (-2.0591)
Same race 0.0024 0.0017 0.0066** 0.0020 0.0035
(1.4884) (0.6798) (2.2316) (0.9726) (1.3759)
Age M -0.0003*** -0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0005***
(-5.3364) (-7.4602) (0.8941) (-2.2267) (-4.7258)
Age F -0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0002**
(-3.0502) (-1.4561) (-3.3600) (-1.8760) (-2.0323)
N. married M 0.0030*** 0.0042*** 0.0015*** 0.0023*** 0.0039***
(6.5778) (5.0679) (3.4952) (4.5521) (4.9771)
N. married M 0.0040*** 0.0033*** 0.0040*** 0.0034*** 0.0043***
(8.4597) (4.0358) (8.5853) (6.7086) (5.4072)
Lonely M 0.0076*** 0.0111*** 0.0040*** 0.0021 0.0136***
(6.8577) (6.0137) (3.3155) (1.5799) (7.6766)
Lonely F 0.0065*** 0.0099*** 0.0026** 0.0015 0.0117***
(6.0099) (5.4721) (2.2929) (1.2527) (6.5796)
Happy M -0.0027** -0.0028 -0.0031** 0.0003 -0.0063***
(-2.4277) (-1.4864) (-2.5257) (0.2583) (-3.5148)
Happy F -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0023
(-1.5397) (-0.8514) (-1.5889) (-1.2600) (-1.2277)
No. obs 84,388 42,948 40,948 42,218 42,170
Pseudo R2 0.1263 0.0981 0.1660 0.1740 0.1031
T-statistics in parentheses. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wealth and income are normalized to
start from 1 and are in logs (Net worth, Hous eq., Fin. assets).
66
67
Figure 3.4: Prediction of the next period marital stability for a couple
Random forest is a highly non-linear model. The model is used to explore feature im-
portance by plotting decrease in the objective function (gini coefficient) that is achieved by
separate including each variable. Two wealth indicators, net worth and housing equity, have
the highest predictive power (figure 3.5). This suggests that marital stability and wealth
involve the two-way relation: ’gray’ divorce negatively impacts wealth of the individuals in
mid and senior age, while wealth itself is a significant (negative) predictor for the probability
of ’gray’ divorce.
Figure 3.5: Most important predictors in Random forest model
Note: Y -axis shows decrease in impurity that is achieved by including each predictor
3.4.3 Evaluation of predictive models performance
This section compares predictive performance of the four models and concludes whether
these models are able to reliably predict probability of ’gray divorce’ for a household. The
results are summarized in table 3.11, including the optimal model specifications, and forecast
performance be each of the four considered indicators. Summary of the optimal specification
for each model is provided in the ’Details’ column, this contains the estimated optimal values
of the hyperparameters. For example, optimal fandom forest model includes 88 trees, which
68
have maximum depth of 37 nodes and minimum sample leaf size of 5 observations.
Out of the four models, random forest has by far the highest performance based on F1
score and Precision. Its leading performance is followed by the artificial neural network
model, then by regularized logistic regression. Classification tree shows the weakest perfor-
mance among all the models. In terms of Recall (percent of true positive cases that are
identified by the model) performance of logistic regression and classification tree is also high.
For these models there is poor performance in terms of Precision as they have very high false
positive rate and ’falsely’ identify many cases as ’gray divorce’.
Table 3.11: Predictive model performance summary
Algorithm Details F1-score Precision Recall Accuracy
Logit + Lasso*
Penalty type: Ridge (’l2’)
’l2’=551.3
0.065 0.034 0.741 0.754
Classification tree
Max depth = 4
Min samples leaf = 33
0.043 0.022 0.797 0.589
Random forest*
Trees = 88, Max depth = 37,
Min samples leaf = 5




0.185 0.120 0.407 0.959
* Features scaled using standard scaling: (xi − xmin)/(xmax − xmin)
Additional approach to evaluate performance of a model is by using receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) plot (figure 3.6). It shows proportion of true positive rate and false
positive rate while the classification threshold of probability moves from 0.0 to 1.0. In case of
a model that can provide perfect forecasts, a ROC curve would be a vertical line along y-axis
and after it achieves 1.0 (all true positive cases are correctly predicted) it then becomes a
vertical line that connects points (0, 1) and (1, 1) on the plot. Area under ROC of the perfect
model equals 1.0. On the other hand, a pure random model would be a 45-degree line with
area under ROC curve of 0.5. All four models are shown to perform better than a purely
random guess, but their performance is inferior in comparison to a hypothetical perfect
model. Random forest has the strongest performance among all the considered models.
69
Figure 3.6: ROC curve of the predictive models
Note: Dashed line represents ’random guess’ model. Higher area under the ROC curve points to higher
predictive performance
3.5 Conclusion
The study explores implications of gray divorce on wealth and wealth components for
those aged 50+. My analysis was motivated by the high and growing significance of this
population category in accumulation of wealth in the economy. While there is lack of prior
studies employing relevant identification strategies to investigate the effect of gray divorce
on wealth, the current study addresses this gap. The study uses semi-parametric difference-
in-differences methodology, combining the DID method with propensity score matching.
For the purpose of the analysis the ‘treated’ group was defined to include individuals that
previously were married and then changed into the divorced category. The control group
included married individuals that did not change their status. For each treated individual a
control individual was selected by a matching based on the lagged economic and demographic
characteristics.
The results indicate that gray divorce has negative impact on net worth, mostly on such
wealth components as housing equity and financial assets, primarily, bank accounts and
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IRAs. The negative impact was confirmed with both intensive and extensive margin of the
outcome variables. In case of the total matched sample, gray divorce increased the probability
of losing positive net worth by 6.5%, and increased the probability of losing positive home
equity by 26.7%. No evidence was obtained that females experience higher decline in net
worth due to gray divorce compared to males. Yet, the results suggest that females are
more likely to experience higher declines in their IRAs and stocks. It is also confirmed that
gray divorce has a stronger impact on older individuals (aged 60+) in comparison to those
in their 50s. The noted deterioration of wealth in response to gray divorce can be related
to the extra costs and foregone economies of scale that are associated with divorce, as well
as with deterioration of mental ability. Results from feasibility tests provided additional
confirmation towards the validity of the baseline findings. Additionally, wealth was shown
to be a key predictor of probability of gray divorce. Specifically, net worth and housing
equity displayed potential to lower the likelihood of a divorces among the households aged
50+. The model with the best forecast performance in this study is random forest. Among
all positive cases that the model identifies, 85% are correctly identified. Additionally, the
model is able to identify 42.4% among the true positive cases. Future research can aim
to further raise the forecast performance of the predictive model, for example by including
additional features. Moreover, there is need for the future research to contrast the relevance
of various features to predict divorces among those aged 50+ as compared to those aged
below 50.
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4.0 The Modernization Hypothesis in the Post-Socialist Economies
Central and Eastern European countries underwent a unique ‘natural experiment’ as they
saw considerable initial democratization after the Soviet Union collapsed and the communist
block dissolved. While these nations started from similar conditions in terms of post-socialist
institutional legacy, their subsequent trajectories of economic and political development sig-
nificantly diverged. The study aims to explore whether positive income-democracy relation,
known as the ‘modernization hypothesis’, holds among the CEE nations, and to evaluate
the relevance of initial conditions to explain the divergence of mentioned development tra-
jectories. Initial political uncertainty captures the power vacuum during the period between
collapse of the socialist systems and before new democratic governments came to power. The
essay implements quantitative measurement of the initial political uncertainty (also known
as ‘initial political disruption’) and evaluates its role to moderate the income-democracy
relationship among the CEE economies. This study elaborates on Walder et al. (2015) who
conceptualized relevance of the initial political disruption as the major development factor
for the CEE nations. My findings confirm a tendency that the initial political disruption
reverses the ‘modernization hypothesis’. The results remained consistent after considering
varying data frequencies, alternative measures of democracy, and after controlling for other
relevant initial conditions.
4.1 Introduction
In the late 1980s, there occurred a unique ‘natural experiment’, as a large group of
Eastern European countries experienced rapid democratization due to collapse of the com-
munist block. These countries had similar socialist legacy and were planned economies with
a single party rule. After communism collapsed in these countries in 1989-1990, and they
underwent initial democratization, the further development paths of these nations diverged.
Analysis of the income-democracy relation of Central and Eastern European economies can
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provide valuable lessons for other nations that experience regime changes. Walder et al.
(2015) conceptualized that initial political disruption was an overlooked critical factor for
the subsequent development of CEE economies. The concept of ‘initial political disruption’
relates to the lag between collapse of socialist and communist governments and emergence of
new democratic ones. During this time, disruptive processes occurred due to the vacuum of
power and lack of legal institutions. The goal of this study is to explore the relation between
economic development and democracy in the post-socialist European countries (Central and
Eastern Europe - CEE), and investigate the capacity of initial political uncertainty in shaping
the nature of the income-democracy relationship.
The idea of positive relation between income and democracy, known as ‘modernization
hypothesis’ was suggested by Lipset (1959) and Lipset (1960) and it has high political-
economic significance. Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009) underlines a need for broader
understanding of the modernization hypothesis, whereas socioeconomic development is asso-
ciated with an increased middle class that is subsequently able to achieve democratic tran-
sition and greater democratic stability. Since its formulation, the modernization hypothesis
was thoroughly tested by numerous researchers, including recent tests by Acemoglu et al.
(2008), Acemoglu et al. (2009), Cervellati et al. (2014), as well as Benhabib et al. (2011) and
Benhabib et al. (2013). Early studies of the income-democracy relation generally evidenced
positive linkage (e.g. Barro 1996). After Acemoglu et al. (2008) for the first time applied
fixed effects panel methodology for testing the modernization hypothesis, no evidence of it
was found, and this cast doubt on the long believed mechanism. Further insight was con-
tributed by Cervellati et al. (2014), who suggested that the income-democracy relation can
behave differently in different country groups. Specifically, the researchers showed negative
income-democracy association for the countries with colonial origins, and positive effect for
the non-colonial countries.
There is a lack of studies that explored modernization hypothesis in case of the Central
and Eastern European nations using relevant empirical identification strategy. The current
investigation extends the mainstream literature along the two main dimensions. First, this
study evaluates the relation between income and democracy in the case of the Central and
Eastern European economies, applying an empirical framework that closely relates to Ace-
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moglu et al. (2008) and Cervellati et al. (2014). Second, this study quantitatively evaluates
the concept of the initial political uncertainty (referred to as ‘initial political disruption’
in Walder et al. 2015) as the key factor to shape subsequent relation between income and
democracy in these nations. Contributions of this study towards the literature is therefore
in undertaking quantitative evaluation of the initial political uncertainty and including it as
a major moderation factor in the income-democracy equation.
The considered mechanism that underlies the empirical analysis in this study is rooted in
the studies by Acemoglu (2008), Hellman (1998), Passarelli and Tabellini (2017) and Walder
et al. (2015). The extended period of political uncertainty, which took place in such coun-
tries as Russia, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan, empowered the abuse of power by former political
leaders (alongside criminal groups), some of whom managed to transform into oligarchs by
capturing control over natural resources, infrastructure, supply chains, and other key eco-
nomic resources. A major way this process occurred was via non-transparent privatization
of the most viable and largest state enterprises at prices that were significantly below their
fair values Walder et al. 2015. As the outcome, after oligarchs gained economic power, they
became capable of establishing high entry barriers, diverting new players from entering the
markets, and postponing any further democratization by leveraging their excessive lobby-
ing capacity (Acemoglu 2008). While economic growth still occurred as large enterprises
managed to expand, in part due to their preferential treatment by government regulators,
democratization process in such economies was considerably slowed down.
The remaining part of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the initial
socioeconomic situation among the CEE economies and its subsequent development. Section
3 introduces the concept of initial political uncertainty and its measurement. Methodology of
the study is detailed in Section 4. The main findings are presented and discussed in Section
5, which is followed by their robustness tests exhibited in section 6. Finally, the concluding
Section 7 completes this study.
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4.2 Democratization and Development in Transition Economies
Before the analysis is presented in the following parts, this section provides an overview
of socioeconomic situation in the CEE group of countries. Peculiarity of these countries
is their socialist legacy, and the fact that they started from relatively similar institutional
conditions. Although the CEE economies started very much alike, their subsequent paths
diverged in terms of both, economic development and democratization. The current section
explores the initial distribution of these among the CEE countries and their subsequent
development dynamics. This section makes a statement that neither initial GDP per capita,
nor initial level of democracy could pre-determine the initial political uncertainty of these
economies, but that rather the initial political uncertainty was randomly assigned.
4.2.1 Size of considered countries
These countries have joint history as all of them were in the socialist block during the
time since the end of World War II till the end of 1980s. As of 2016, Russia was the largest
by its territory, total GDP PPP and total population among the CEE countries. But based
on the GDP per capita, three Central European economies, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and
Slovakia, led the group, whereas Russia ranked tenth.
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Figure 4.1: General comparison of the CEE countries
4.2.2 Economic development indicators
In 1990, real GDP per capita was the highest in Czech Republic, followed by Russia,
Poland and Kazakhstan. The highest increase was in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Lithuania,
Latvia and Poland. In fact, Russia and Kazakhstan saw high initial political disruption
despite having some of the highest starting GDP per capita. For three countries, namely
Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, real GDP per capita in 2016 was lower than its starting
level in 1990.
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Figure 4.2: GDP per capita in CEE countries in 1990
Figure 4.3: GDP per capita changes in CEE countries
The starting Gini index was the lowest in Slovakia, Czech republic and Romania, while it
was the highest in Tajikistan. During 1990-2016, Gini index lowered in just four economies
- Moldova, Mongolia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, indicating increased equality. While for all
others it increased showing the growth of inequality among these nations.
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Figure 4.4: Gini index in CEE countries in 1990
*
Figure 4.5: Gini index changes in CEE countries
Human development index (HDI) was close among CEE economies. Moreover, over the
two decades HDI has grown for all countries. While in some of these nations growth was
minimal (Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan), for others it was considerable (Mongolia,
Azerbaijan, and Croatia).
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Figure 4.6: Human development index in CEE countries in 1990
*
Figure 4.7: Human development index dynamics in CEE countries
4.2.3 Democracy development in CEE nations
Before the collapse of the socialist system, the CEE countries had similar levels of democ-
racy. This is linked to availability of only one ruling party that successfully suppressed any
other political forces and deprived people of their political freedoms. Specifically, in 1989 the
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level of democracy (based on Polity regime measure) for Czechoslovakia, the former union of
Czech Republic and Slovak Republics, for Bulgaria and Mongolia scored zero and it was the
same level as for the Peoples Republic of China. Democracy in the Soviet Union (USSR) 1 as
well as in Yugoslavia, former union of Serbia, Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo, scored one and
it was just a point above the level of China, indicating slightly more democratic regimes. For
comparison, democracy level in the US and UK (based on Polity regime measure) scored the
maximum of 10 points in 1989. Such figures indicate that initial level of democracy, prior
to the collapse of the communist and socialist governments, was similar among all the CEE
economies and was not neither able to predetermine the initial political uncertainty in these
countries, their their subsequent diverging trajectories.
The main democracy indicator that is used in this study is Political freedom. The indi-
cator is calculated by Freedom House for 195 countries based on 125 lower-level indicators.
Two main aggregation parts are blended together, namely political rights and civil liberties
(FreedomHouse 2017). The original scaling defines 1 as the most free while 7 is the least
free conditions. For the purpose of this analysis, Political freedom variable was re-scaled to
range between 0 and 100 with higher values representing freer political conditions.
In 1991 some countries, such as Poland and Czech Republic, already experienced tran-
sition towards democratic government, while others were stuck in their period of initial
political disruption, as democratic governments in these nations had not formed yet. Thus,
the CEE countries already exhibited heterogeneity by their level of democracy in 1991,
moreover their subsequent development trajectories diverged further (Appendix C.6 ). The
group of countries with relatively high Political freedom included Czech Republic, Poland,
Estonia, and Hungary. In the years following the collapse of socialist system, low political
freedom was observed in Albania, Georgia, Romania, Serbia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. All
the countries which initially moved to high levels of democracy managed to subsequently
maintain this achieved level. But there was strong divergence among other nations. While
Georgia, Albania, Moldova and Serbia managed to considerably improve their political free-
dom, substantial decline of democracy took place in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. For
1USSR included 15 constituents: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan
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some countries with low democracy in the beginning of their path there was even further
deterioration - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan obtained autocratic rulers who
pushed back initial democratization processes.
In the robustness check section of the current study, two other measures of democracy
are considered (Polity regime by Polity IV project, and Freedom of the Press by Freedom
House). It should be noted that these measures are rather tightly correlated 2. Dynamics of
the democracy based on these measures showed starting distribution and time trends that
are similar to that of the Political freedom.
Further technical details about Regime and Freedom of the press are shown in Appendix
C.2. Also, country-level dynamics of each of the three measures of democracy are shown in
Appendices C.6 - C.8.
4.3 Initial Conditions
Evaluation of the income-democracy relation in CEE economies is performed for the total
sample, as well as for the sub-samples obtained by splitting the total sample based on the
initial political disruption. The concept of initial political disruption, as well as a set of other
relevant initial conditions was obtained from political economy and economic development
literature (e.g. Barro 1996; De Melo 2001; Walder et al. 2015). Rationale behind the major
’initial conditions’ is provided below, while details of their calculation are shown in Appendix
C.1.
4.3.1 Political disruption
Among the initial conditions, the current study relies on the phenomenon of ’initial po-
litical disruption’ or ’political origins’ of CEE as it was conceptualized by Walder et al.
(2015). The ’political origins’ of CEE relate to the nature of political transition from social-
2Pearson correlation coefficient between Political freedom and Polity Regime is 0.869, between Political
freedom and Freedom of the press is 0.943, and that between Polity Regime and Freedom of the press is
0.844. All these correlation coefficients are significant at 1% level.
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ism towards democratic institutions. It is suggested that the extent of ’political disruption’
significantly affected the nature of diverging trajectories of these countries. The mechanisms
(channels) of such effect are explained below. Also, the approach used for construction and
measurement of the variable is detailed in Appendix C.3.
The idea of ’political disruption’ in CEE countries and discussion of its high relevance is
due to Walder et al. (2015). The researcher compared group of the post-communist Euro-
pean economies that were not part of the Soviet Union versus the post-communist economies
that previously constituted the Soviet Union. Before the end of 1980s, communist party was
the sole owner of either all or vast majority of productive assets in each of these economies.
At some moment in time of late 1980s it became apparent that the communist party was
not able to control productive assets anymore. In several countries, including Poland, Czech
Republic, and Mongolia among others, new democratic parliament and government were es-
tablished rapidly, taking over the communist party. But in other post-communist economies
(e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan among others) there was prolonged interim period accom-
panied by the uncertainty. In these countries it took years after the end of the communism
rule and before a new multi-party parliament was freely elected and appointed democratic
government, which was then able to foster development of valid democratic institutions. This
intermittent period of uncertainty was associated with the lack of property rights protection,
weakness of legal institutions as the communist party lacked its previous power while new
democratic institutions had not emerged year. The period is referred by Walder et al. (2015)
as the period of ’political disruption’.
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Figure 4.8: Initial political uncertainty in CEE countries
During the period of uncertainty (or ’political disruption’) a number of disruptive pro-
cesses took place and caused capture of control over productive assets by either former
communist leaders, criminals, or newly established dictators. It is thus suggested that the
extent to which the control over the economy was captured by a limited groups of ’new
winners’ further prevented the democratization in these countries, irrespective of whether
these countries faced economic growth. The idea of ’new winners’ is detailed in Hellman
(1998) indicating that on the initial stages of reforms, certain interest groups become win-
ners, but then they can turn into great obstacles of any further reforms. In many post-USSR
countries the period of ’political disruption’ was associated with rise of oligarchs, killings
of many businessmen, unfair privatization of state-owned assets by businesses associated
with the ruling politicians. Walder et al. (2015) indicates that during this period there were
significant recessions as post-USSR countries experienced hyperinflation and lost about 50-
80% of the size of their economy.
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4.3.2 Other initial conditions
Therefore, as was previously mentioned, Political disruption was the period of property
rights uncertainty. According to Walder et al. (2015), this had immense effect on how coun-
tries developed, including their democratization paths. But this was not the only initial
condition, and there were other ones. In the robustness check section, the analysis considers
relevance of other initial conditions: resource endowment, initial income level, market mem-
ory, state independence, and regional tensions3. These initial conditions were selected based
De Melo (2001), BenYishay and Grosjean (2014), as well as Barro (1996).
’Resource endowment’ suggests that higher dependence on resources prevents modern-
ization. The reason is that for resources-rich economies where strong rent-seeking incentive
among incumbent elites. The effect was measured as the share of employed in mining and
natural resources industry in 1989, available from BenYishay and Grosjean (2014) 4.
Low initial income or threshold GDP level - countries with initially low level of GDP are
more likely to revert modernization. The ’starting’ real GDP per capita was obtained for all
countries as of 1990 from Maddison (2010). The variable was used in Barro (1996) to argue
that countries below certain income threshold cannot sustain initial democratization.
‘Market memory’ indicates the time that an economy was under socialist planning. Fol-
lowing De Melo (2001), longer time under social planning is associated with lower market
memory. ‘Geographic location’ is measured as an indicator variable indicating whether a
country borders on a democratic non-communist state. De Melo (2001) uses this variable to
evaluate access to Western markets.
State independence and institutions aim to measure the maturity of country institutions.
The variable contains three categories - newly established states, countries of federal states,
and countries that were independent prior to 1989. Thus, newly created states have to
develop more institutions, as compared to countries that were independent over longer time.
Finally ‘regional tensions’ capture the fact whether a given country was involved in
military conflict or now (De Melo 2001). Countries that were in military conflict after the
3Technical details of these variables are summarized in Appendix C.1
4The variable is available in BenYishay and Grosjean (2014) for 26 economies, but it is missing for Kosovo,
Macedonia, Mongolia, and Turkmenistan
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collapse of communist and socialist parties, incurred disruptive consequences of such conflicts
for both, their economic and democratic situation.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Panel data analysis
General set-up of regression analysis follows Cervellati et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al.
(2008). Specifically, Cervellati et al. (2014) used the approach to consider sub-samples based
on whether a country was a colony, and they used interaction of GDP and the colony indicator
variable for fixed effect estimation. In the current study, the relation between democracy
and income per capita is evaluated based on equations (11) and (12) below:
di,t = β0 + αdi,t−1 + γyi,t−1 + δi + µt + ui,t (11)
di,t = β0 + αdi,t−1 + φ1(yi,t−1 · ci) + φ2ci + γyi,t−1 + δi + µt + ui,t (12)
Where, d - is a measure of democracy, y - log of real GDP per capita, δ and µ are
country and year fixed effects. Equation (12) includes c, which is time-invariant dummy that
indicates the initial political uncertainty (Uncer or IPU). My analysis aims to investigate
the following hypotheses. First, the unconditional modernization hypothesis: H1: γ > 0.
Second, the conditional modernization hypothesis: H2: φ1 < 0. That is the considered effect
of the initial political uncertainty operates to decrease (or to invert) the positive income-
democracy relation. In addition to the above, direct effect of the initial political uncertainty
on democratization is tested: H3: φ2 < 0. The above equations represent baseline estimation
method, while additional estimation approaches are detailed below.
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4.4.2 Two-stage least squares (TSLS)
Estimation of the effect of income on democracy involves a significant endogeneity prob-
lem. In fact, while modernization hypothesis argues that income causes democracy (e.g.
Acemoglu et al. 2008; Cervellati et al. 2014), there is certain evidence of the reverse casual
link indicating democracy having an impact on economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019;
Benhabib et al. 2011; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005. Therefore, under endogeneity, estimated
coefficients in the baseline model could be biased. To deal with this potential setback, two-
stage least square methodology was applied. Lagged trade-weighted world income was used
as the instrument for lagged GDP per capita. The approach follows Acemoglu et al. (2008).
The F-statistic of robust regression of GDP per capita on the instrument has F-statistic
of 27.14, which is above the conventional threshold of 10, indicating solid performance of
this instrumental variable. The instrument was constructed as follows. For a given country
i from among the CEE economies, for each country ’j’ with which it has trade relations,
weights wij are determined based on significance of the trade between i and j relatively to
total international trade of country i. Such weights were constructed based on aggregated 4-
year periods during the sample period (weights are hold constant within the 4-year periods).
Then the trade-weighted income is determined as follows:
Ŷi,t−1 = Σ
N
j=1,j 6=iωijtYj,t−1, j ∈ 1, ..., N (13)
4.4.3 System GMM model
Another approach aimed to deal with the fact that inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable can incur a bias into the estimated coefficients. The system GMM method obtains
first differences of the baseline model, so that the country fixed effects are eliminated from
the equation (4).
∆di,t = α∆di,t−1 + γ∆yi,t−1 + ∆X
′
i,t−1β + ∆µt + ∆ui,t (14)
Also, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator requires a number of moments conditions,
specifically no autocorrelation in lags of differenced dependent variable, no serial correlation
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in the residual term, as well as no correlation between lagged dependent variable and the
residual term.
4.4.4 Robustness tests
For robustness check, a number of additional procedures were implemented. First, al-
ternative data frequencies were considered, using three-year and five-year time intervals.
Second, other measures of democracy were evaluated in addition to the Freedom House in-
dicator of Political freedom’. These alternative measures were Polity International measure
of political regime, and Freedom House measure of the freedom of the press. Third, a num-
ber of other initial conditions variables are considered, the baseline results are shown to
remain after controlling for all these initial conditions. Besides, performance of other initial
conditions is compared to that of the initial political uncertainty.
4.4.5 Data
The main dataset contains annual frequency data for all 30 post-socialist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (Appendix C.4 ). The sample includes data for 16 years, ranging
from 1991 up to 2016. Relevant data was obtained from multiple sources, including the World
Development Indicators, Freedom House, Polity International, and UN Comtrade. Relevant
details for each variable as well as data sources for each variable are stated in the Appendix
C.1.
4.5 Results and Analysis
This section evaluates the relation between development and democracy for the Central
and Eastern European economies, and explores the moderating role of the initial political
uncertainty. The analysis firstly compares mean values of relevant economic and democracy
indicators by the sub-set of countries with high and low initial political uncertainty, then
regression results are provided.
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4.5.1 Univariate analysis
The descriptive statistics for the overall sample, as well as for the two sub-sets of countries
by initial political disruption, are shown in table 4.1. For each included variable the difference
of means between the two subsets was calculated and tested for its statistical significance.
The comparison between the countries from the subsets organized by level of their initial
political uncertainty indicates substantial differences between the two groups. There is lower
level of democracy among the countries with high initial political uncertainty, as well as lower
GDP per capita, lower HDI and higher inequality based on Gini index. This is despite the
fact that in this group of countries, average initial GDP per capita was significantly higher
than in the subgroup of countries that did not experience high initial political uncertainty.
The results suggest negative impact of the initial political uncertainty on both, income and
democracy.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics by the level of initial political uncertainty
Total sample Subsets by level of uncertainty
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Low High Difference
Uncert 810 1233.530 1026.250 247.260 2219.800 -1972.530 ***
Fhouse 810 57.202 34.121 72.757 41.646 31.111 ***
Polity 810 67.609 33.988 81.715 53.502 28.213 ***
Freedom of Press 690 57.177 27.931 71.880 43.698 28.182 ***
GDP 751 6357.590 5390.520 8213.840 4592.950 3620.880 ***
GDP 90 810 5966.030 2386.360 5474.800 6457.260 -982.460 ***
HDI 698 0.732 0.076 0.753 0.711 0.041 ***
Gini 703 0.322 0.053 0.302 0.339 -0.037 ***
Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The initial findings from descriptive statistics are further explored using scatter plots,
evaluating the linkages between economic development, democracy and initial political un-
certainty. The results in figure 9 point towards negative relationship between the initial
political uncertainty and democracy, as well as between the initial political uncertainty and
the level of income per capita. High level of democracy and low level of initial political
uncertainty was observed in Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, as well as Romania and
Bulgaria. On the other hand, high initial political uncertainty and low level of democracy
occurred in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Russia and Kazakhstan (Figure
9A). The suggested relation between initial political uncertainty and income is also evident
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(Figure 9B). Countries that have high income and low initial uncertainty include Slovenia,
Czech Republic and Slovakia, while nations with the highest initial uncertainty and lowest
income include Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, as well as Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine,
and Moldova.
Figure 4.9: Relevance of initial political uncertainty for income and democracy
The relation between economic development and level of democracy seems to be positive
among the countries with low initial political disruption. But the relationship is negative
for the economies with high IPU (figure 4.10). In the second group the three Baltic states
are considered outliers as they have both high level of democracy and high GDP per capita,
despite experiencing significant initial political uncertainty. These three Baltic countries
are very small economies. They are in close proximity to European Union, have market
memory and also lack natural resources. These additional factors could be responsible for
these nations not following the oligarchic development path.
Figure 4.10: Economic development, democracy and initial political uncertainty
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4.5.2 Main results
Analysis of the relation between income and democracy and of the moderation role of
the initial political disruption starts with the fixed effects regressions in table 4.2. Such
approach is close to that in Cervellati et al. (2014) who explored moderation role of colonial
origins.
Positive relation between economic development and democracy is observed in column 1,
where no fixed effects are included, neither standard errors are clustered at the country level.
This represents conventional positive correlation between income and democracy previously
evidenced by numerous studies.
Furthermore, after controlling for the past democracy history, as well as for the time
and country fixed effects, the effect of economic development is not statistically significant.
Therefore, the results in columns (1) and (2) follow the approach by Acemoglu et al. (2008).
As was the case with Acemoglu et al. (2008), the findings in columns (1) evidence positive
relation between income and democracy, while after taking fixed effects into account the
relation becomes insignificant. The results starting from column (3) take ’Uncertainty’ into
the account. In column (3) the interaction term between income and uncertainty is significant
and has negative sign. This suggests that the initial political uncertainty can decrease the
income-democracy relation and possibly make it negative. Based on the results in column
(3), it can be argued that a CEE country with Uncertainty period of 270 days (1st quartile)
has overall GDP slope coefficient of 2.16, while a country with Uncertainty period of 2,131
days (3rd quartile) has overall GDP slope of -1.57. In case of the latter, a 10% increase
in GDP is associated with a subsequent average decline in democracy by 0.16 percentage
points.
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Table 4.2: Relation between development and democracy using fixed effects
A. Total sample B. Level of IPU
Low IPU High IPU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fhouset−1 0.972*** 0.735*** 0.710*** 0.701*** 0.699***
(94.12) (15.42) (14.23) (8.53) (11.00)
GDPt−1 0.628* -2.459 2.696 1.710 -4.748
(1.70) (-1.00) (0.98) (0.55) (-1.38)




Time FE no yes yes yes yes
Country FE no yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE ne yes yes yes yes
Num. obs 721 721 721 351 370
Num. countries 30 30 30 15 15
Adj R2 0.952 0.964 0.964 0.918 0.968
Dependent variable is Freedom House measure of democracy normalized to 0-100 scale. GDP is natural
log of real GDP per capita. Uncer measures initial political uncertainty. High IPU and Low IPU subsets
are separated by the median. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Sig. *- 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%.
Furthermore in panel B, the same model as in column (2) is estimated for the subsets
obtained by splitting the sample based on initial political uncertainty (IPU). The median
level of the uncertainty was used as the benchmark to split the two subsets. Generally,
the results in columns (4) and (5) are in line with the findings in column (3), as positive
slope coefficient on GDP is evidenced for the countries with low IPU, while negative one is
observed for the subset with high uncertainty. Yet their statistical significance is marginal,
which could be due to the relatively small sample sizes.
4.5.3 TSLS and dynamic panel results
Further analysis of the income-democracy relationship for CEE countries aims to over-
come possible limitations of the main results, which were prone to endogeneity issues - the
possibility of the two-way causal link between income and democracy. For this purpose the
dynamic GMM panel estimator by Arellano and Bond is used in panel A, as well as the
two-stage least squares method - in panel B. Findings from these two methods are similar to
each other and to the main results. The results in columns (1) and (4) should be compared
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to those in column (3) of the main results from table 4.2. While findings in columns (2) and
(3) (as well as those in columns 5 and 6) should be compared to those in columns (4) and
(5) of the main results.
Dynamic GMM results in column (1) evidence that the initial political uncertainty weak-
ens the income-democracy positive association. The GMM results for the two subsets in-
dicate positive and negative association between income and democracy in countries with,
respectively, low and high IPU levels. Similar findings are shown in panel B that includes the
second stage results 5. The TSLS results for the two subsets are more statistically significant
than the equivalent coefficients from GMM method, but still lack statistical power to reject
the null hypothesis.
Table 4.3: Relation between development and democracy: Dynamic panel and 2SLS
A. Arellano-Bond estimator B. TSLS estimator
All Low IPU High IPU All Low IPU High IPU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fhouset−1 0.604*** 0.710*** 0.592*** 0.901*** 0.772*** 0.945***
(8.20) (8.05) (11.26) (8.70) (13.74) (12.26)
GDPt−1 10.268 2.903 -4.873 1.154 1.578 -6.761
(1.54) (0.65) (-0.93) (0.76) (1.28) (-1.45)
GDPt−1 · Uncert -0.004*** -0.003
(-2.58) (-0.95)
Uncert -0.000 -0.003*** 0.000
(-0.26) (-7.97) (0.07)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. obs 691 336 355 669 196 105
Num. countries 30 15 15 30 30 30
Wald χ2 48982 *** 228.10 *** 131.57 ***
Adj R2 0.934 0.837 0.929
Dependent variable is Freedom House measure of democracy normalized to 0-100 scale. GDP is natural
log of real GDP per capita. Uncer measures initial political uncertainty. High IPU and Low IPU subsets
are separated by the median. Robust t-stats in parentheses. Sig. *- 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%. First stage
F-stat from bivariate regression: (4)- F=10.6***, (5)- F=15.05***, (6)- F=2.43.
These findings can be argued to provide additional evidence towards supporting the
statement that GDP and democracy have positive association in countries with low initial
uncertainty, while in the countries that experienced prolonged uncertainty period this relation
can be inverted.
5Trade-weighted world income was used as the instrumental variable for the GDP per capita. The IV
construction follows Acemoglu et al. (2008), p.824
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4.6 Robustness Tests Results
Goal of the current section is to perform robustness checks for the negative effect of the
initial political uncertainty on the income-democracy relation. The first test (Table 4.4, panel
A) uses alternative data frequencies (annual frequency, and 3-year and 5-year aggregated
periods). The second test employs alternative measures of democracy - regime measure
and freedom of the press (Table 4.4, panel B). The third test considers for a broader set of
relevant initial conditions and compares their effect to that of the initial political uncertainty
(Table 4.5).
4.6.1 Alternative data frequency and democracy measures
The results by measure of democracy and alternative frequency are indicative of the
same negative moderation effect of Uncertainty on the income-democracy relation. With
different measures of democracy, the cross-term between Uncertainty and lagged GDP is
negative in all specifications. Yet limitation of this test is that the cross-term has low
statistical significance for two auxiliary democracy measures. Additionally, there is negative
and significant direct effect of Uncertainty on each of the three measures of democracy. In
panel B, the interaction of uncertainty and income is negative and statistically significant
across all three time frequencies. Moreover, magnitude of the cross-term increases with the
length of time period, so that the slope coefficient of the cross-term under 5-year frequency is
approximately three time higher as compared to that under 1-year frequency. Therefore, the
results from table 4.4 provide support towards the main results about negative moderation
effect of initial political uncertainty.
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Table 4.4: Relation between development and democracy under alternative settings
A. Measures of democracy B. Time frequencies







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracyt−1 0.710*** 0.713*** 0.810*** 0.710*** 0.446*** 0.254*
(14.23) (12.72) (32.36) (14.23) (4.57) (1.83)
GDPt−1 2.696 -2.736 5.004* 2.696 5.574 13.417***
(0.98) (-0.71) (1.97) (0.98) (1.26) (3.11)
GDPt−1 · Uncert -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.006**
(-3.25) (-0.23) (-1.66) (-3.25) (-2.77) (-2.40)
Uncert -0.021** -0.001 0.021*** -0.021** -0.034** -0.052**
(-2.29) (-0.09) (3.29) (-2.29) (-2.10) (-2.44)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. obs. 721 721 645 721 227 118
Num. countries 30 30 30 30 30 30
Adj R2 0.964 0.963 0.983 0.964 0.958 0.968
Dependent variables are indicated measures of democracy normalized to 0-100 scale. GDP is natural log
of real GDP per capita. Uncer measures initial political uncertainty. High IPU and Low IPU subsets
are separated by the median. Robust t-stats in parentheses. Sig. *- 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%.
4.6.2 Relevance of other initial conditions
This section considers other relevant initial conditions, such as resource endowment,
starting per capita income, market memory, and compares their performance to that of the
initial political uncertainty. The results in columns (1) correspond to the main results that
are augmented by including controls for all five other initial conditions. Then, columns
(2) through (6) separately consider the direct and moderating effects for each of the initial
conditions.
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Table 4.5: Relevance of other initial conditions for democracy using fixed effects
Measures of initial conditions
Uncer Resource Income90 Marmem State Rten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fhouset−1 0.726*** 0.737*** 0.728*** 0.722*** 0.731*** 0.736***
(14.78) (15.35) (14.66) (15.12) (14.95) (15.15)
GDPt−1 2.920 -3.352 19.910 4.878 -2.632 -1.733
(1.14) (-1.12) (1.39) (1.11) (-1.05) (-0.63)
GDPt−1 · IC -0.002*** 0.988 -2.662 -0.110* 1.111 -1.348
(-2.87) (1.03) (-1.60) (-1.81) (1.13) (-0.69)
IC -0.041*** -15.249* 9.845 8.826*** -5.022 3.302
(-4.88) (-1.86) (0.79) (4.77) (-0.65) (0.22)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. obs. 721 721 721 721 721 721
Num. countries 30 30 30 30 30 30
Adj R2 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964
Model in column (1) controls for the five other initial conditions: Resource, Income90, Marmem, State,
and Rten. Freedom House ‘Political Freedom’ is the dependent variable. IC indicates a measure of
initial conditions. Considered ICs: Uncer - initial political uncertainty, Resource - resource endowment,
Income90 - initial income, Marmem - market memory, State - state independence, Rten - regional
tensions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Sig. *- 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%. GDP is natural log of real
GDP per capita.
Among the considered six initial conditions, significant moderation effect is evidenced
for just market memory (Marmem), in addition to Uncer. Also, significant direct effect, in
addition to Uncer is evidenced for the following two - resource endowment (Resource), and
market memory (Marmem). The effect of resource endowment is in line with the expectation
that higher resource endowment facilitates greater rent-seeking with its adverse impact on
democracy (BenYishay and Grosjean 2014). The direct effect on democracy turns out to
be positive for market memory, suggesting that countries with greater free market legacy,
ceteris paribus, have greater chances to experience improvement in democracy. No effect is
observed for the starting income per capita (Income90), state institutions (State) or regional
tensions (Rten).
In general, initial political uncertainty was confirmed to be one of the key few underlying
factors that significantly moderate the relation between income and democracy, as well as
pre-determined trends in democracy among the CEE countries.
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4.7 Conclusion
The analysis evaluates the income-democracy nexus for post-socialist countries of the
Central and Eastern Europe. Special attention is provided towards the role of initial political
uncertainty as the major moderating factor that influenced the nature of the relation between
income and democracy of these nations.
The initial political uncertainty is a proxy for the period of economic and political anarchy
that occurred in the interval between collapse of the socialist party and enabling of the new
democratic governments. A prolonged period of initial political uncertainty is associated
with extensive rent-seeking, office abuse by top-ranking authorities, lack of property rights
protection, and weakness of other crucial governmental institutions.
The obtained results evidence a negative moderation effect of the initial political uncer-
tainty on the association between income and democracy. It can be claimed that a positive
income-democracy relation (known as the ‘modernization hypothesis’) holds in the CEE
countries that had short-lived initial political uncertainty. These CEE economies, which
experienced prolonged periods of the initial political uncertainty, exhibit negative relation-
ship between their income and democracy. This latter effect can be characterized as the
‘inverted modernization hypothesis’. The moderating effect of initial political uncertainty,
despite being statistically significant also has reasonable economic significance. In countries
with low initial political uncertainty (of less than 1200 days), a 10% increase in GDP is
associated with subsequent increase in democracy by 0.17 percentage points. Meanwhile,
a similar increase in GDP for those with high initial political uncertainty (over 1200 days)
is associated with subsequent decline in democracy of 0.48 percentage points. The results
are shown to be consistent when performing robustness tests using different data frequencies
and different measures of democracy.
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5.0 Conclusions
My dissertation aimed to address several significant phenomena in the areas of financial
and applied economics. Specifically, I explored common ownership concentration, and its
impact on corporate payouts and investments, wealth implications of marital instability
among the elderly, and the role of political disruption for the subsequent relation between
income and democracy of countries in transition. The study builds upon prior literature in
the areas of financial economics, health economics, and political economy, and it contributes
towards these literature areas in numerous ways. Each of the three essays illustrated the
ways that such econometric methods as difference-in-differences, propensity score matching,
event study, two-stage least squares can be applied in order to provide causal identification
for the considered problems.
Three main conclusions of this thesis are as follows: First, common ownership concentra-
tion results in lower competition among firms, and thus leads to higher payouts, more intense
industry consolidation and lower capital investments. These effects are lower in magnitude
for industries that are exposed to import competition from China. Second, ‘gray divorce’ has
negative implications for financial wealth and home equity of divorcing individuals. Gray
divorce increases the probability of losing positive wealth by over 5%. The negative wealth
implications of gray divorce increase with age. Also, gray divorces can be predicted with
reasonable precision using machine learning modeling, which can be of relevance for social
policy-makers. Third, the case of post-socialist European countries evidenced that a long-run
development trajectory of a country in transition is highly dependent on its initial political
disruption (i.e. the interim period between the collapse of the old regime and emergence of
a new government). Countries that experienced high initial political disruption saw nega-
tive relation between their income and democracy, while nations with low initial uncertainty




6.1 A: Common Ownership Concentration Auxiliary Materials
6.1.1 Pairwise correlation
Table 6.1: Pairwise correlation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) DCO 1.000
(2) PCF 0.366*** 1.000
(3) PCS 0.429*** -0.208*** 1.000
(4) Payouts 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 1.000
(5) Buybacks 0.031*** 0.001 0.019*** 0.736*** 1.000
(6) Buybacks > 0 0.085*** 0.064*** -0.004 0.309*** 0.323*** 1.000
(7) Cash -0.023*** -0.241*** 0.206*** 0.030*** 0.032*** -0.054*** 1.000
(8) Total assets -0.018*** 0.039*** -0.016*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.100*** -0.088*** 1.000
(9) Capex -0.050*** -0.025*** 0.007 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.031*** -0.077*** -0.003 1.000
(10) Leverage 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.000 1.000
(11) EBIT 0.033*** 0.108*** -0.074*** 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.166*** -0.183*** 0.059*** -0.017*** 0.001 1.000
(12) Net income < 0 -0.051*** -0.125*** 0.077*** -0.096*** -0.111*** -0.215*** 0.183*** -0.112*** -0.000 0.003 -0.404*** 1.000
(13) Tobin’s Q -0.002 -0.038*** 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.017*** -0.034*** 0.106*** -0.016*** 0.012*** -0.002 -0.200*** 0.043*** 1.000
(14) HHI 0.236*** 0.539*** -0.399*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.062*** -0.180*** -0.008*** -0.037*** 0.001 0.082*** -0.098*** -0.024*** 1.000
(15) No Firms (sic3) -0.150*** -0.489*** 0.408*** 0.006 0.020*** -0.062*** 0.387*** -0.056*** -0.023*** -0.009*** -0.173*** 0.178*** 0.065*** -0.448***
6.1.2 Propsensity scores distribution

































































Note: The two left plots indicate distribution of treated and control subsamples prior to matching. The
two right plots show distribution of treated and control subsamples after matching.
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6.1.3 Simulation analysis of common ownership concentration measures
This part explores the nature of the considered measures of common ownership. Three
scenarios are considered that start from the same hypothetical starting conditions. It is
needed to be mentioned that if all institutional investors (’owners’) have a 5% or more in
each firm in the same market, further increase in ownership share would not increase common
ownership. Therefore scenarios that are considered here include several firms that are not
commonly owned.
Table 6.2: Simulation scenarios details
Scenarios
(1) Mergers (2) Mergers (3) Increase in
State among firms among owners ownership shares
(1) Starting Five firms each has market share 20%
conditions Owner 1 has 5% in Firm 1
Owner 2 has 5% share in Firm 2
Owners 3-4 have 5% share in each Firm 3 - 5
(2) Change A Firms 4 and 5 Owner 4 acquires Each owner has
merge Owner 5 share of 7%
(3) Change B Firms 1 and 2 Owner 1 acquires Each owner has
merge Owner 2 share of 9%
Table 6.3: Simulation results for common ownership concentration measures
Scenarios
State DCO PCF PCS ∆HHI
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
(0) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 2400 2400 2400
(1) 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.60 1600 2400 2400
(2) 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.60 1600 2400 2400
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6.1.4 Panel results using firm-level fixed effects
While the baseline results in the body of this study include SIC3 industry fixed effects
and time fixed effects, for the purpose of feasibility the current part provides results with
firm-specific fixed effects and time fixed effects. The results are similar to those with SIC3
industry-specific fixed effects in Table 3. Namely, higher common ownership is associated
with greater payouts, higher markups, lower capital investments and more active industry
consolidation.
Table 6.4: Panel results using firm-level fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Dividends Buybacks Markup Capex M&A
DCO 0.681*** 0.437*** 0.220 4.819 -0.947*** 0.473**
(3.80) (6.91) (2.43) (0.43) (-3.26) (2.30)
DCO: Mean (SD) 0.14 (0.16)
DepVar: Mean (SD) 5.8 (15.4) 4.5 (16.0) 4.4 (10.5) 105.9 (486.5) 6.2 (16.8) 7.2 (11.3)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firms FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,171 76,138
Firms 10,357 10,357 10,357 10,357 10,330 10,357
R2 within 0.264 0.228 0.249 0.001 0.023 0.072
R2 between 0.273 0.494 0.189 0.011 0.003 0.069
R2 overall 0.177 0.315 0.140 0.002 0.002 0.044
Covariates are Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI, Size.
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Payouts, Dividends,
Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO is density of common ownership. Fixed
effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using mean time-invariant
market capitalization. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values
for payouts and M&A)
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6.1.5 Tobit regressions results
It can indicate that the outcome variable, such as dividends, share buybacks or capital
investments are truncated at zero. In this case it can be argued for the need of using Tobit
regression that considers latent dependent variable y and its observed non-negative realiza-
tion y∗. Marginal effects from Tobit model are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the
coefficients from the baseline results (Table 3). This is in line with expectations, as accord-
ing to Angrist and Pischke (2008) Tobit marginal effects should be similar in comparison to
coefficients of the equivalent linear model.
Table 6.5: Tobit regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payouts Dividends Buybacks Markup Capex M&A
DCO 0.541** 0.235* 0.396 3.463 -0.447*** 0.373
(2.06) (1.82) (1.45) (1.14) (-2.72) (0.84)
DCO: Mean (SD) 0.14 (0.16)
DepVar: Mean (SD) 5.8 (15.4) 4.5 (16.0) 4.4 (10.5) 105.9 (486.5) 6.2 (16.8) 7.2 (11.3)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,487 78,171 76,138
Industries (SIC3) 245 245 245 245 245 245
PseudoR2 0.115 0.226 0.122 0.003 0.060 0.058
Marginal effects are presented (t-statistics in parentheses). Covariates are Own, Size, Leverage,
Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI, Size. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Payouts, Dividends, Buybacks, Capex, and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO
is density of common ownership. Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions
are weighted using total market capitalization. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics con-
ditional on positive values for payouts and M&A)
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6.1.6 Placebo test for difference-in-differences results
This part provides results of placebo test for difference-in-difference analysis. For this
purpose the event (scandal) time was falsely picked to be 2012, instead of 2004. Such choice
is sufficiently far from the actual event time, and also is outside of the timing of financial
crisis. In such set-up the difference-in-differences effect is not available, indicating the actual
results were not driven by model design or any systematic difference between the two groups.
The placebo analysis was performed using matched sample.
Table 6.6: Placebo test for difference-in-differences results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Payouts Dividends Buybacks Markup Capex M&A DCO
Treatedj · Postt -0.735 -0.287 -0.448 -0.666 -0.587 0.504 0.003
(-0.91) (-0.73) (-0.65) (-0.19) (-1.49) (0.71) (0.23)
Postt -0.532** 0.134 -0.666*** -0.293 1.095*** 1.163*** 0.189***
(-2.16) (1.11) (-3.19) (-0.28) (9.09) (5.06) (42.89)
Treatedj -6.336*** -0.443 -5.893*** -14.839** -1.614* 2.828* 0.205***
(-3.72) (-0.53) (-4.09) (-2.06) (-1.94) (1.91) (6.76)















Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8,983 8,983 8,983 8,983 8,962 8,696 8,983
R2 0.591 0.580 0.507 0.323 0.641 0.203 0.793
Covariates are Inst ownt−1, Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1,
Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. Fixed effects included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are
weighted using total market capitalization. Sample is limited to years 2010 - 2014. Significance levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on
positive values for payouts and M&A
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6.1.7 Panel result by sub-sample in wide format
The current part provides some results in ’wide’ format. Specifically, these are the results
when effect of common ownership concentration (proxied by DCO - density of common
ownership) was tested to be different by sub-samples within the general sample. In the main
body of the study these effects is evaluated by including interaction term between DCO and
a respective dummy variable. An alternative set-up when a separate model is estimated for
each sub-sample is provided in this appendix.
Such analysis was performed in the following cases: (1) to evaluate whether the effect of
common ownership is different for the cross-owned firms and not cross-owned firms (Table
F1, corresponds to Table 4 in the main body), (2) to evaluate whether the effect of common
ownership is different for the firms in industries that face high import competition, aka
’China shock’ (Table F2, corresponds to Table 11 in the main body), and (3) to evaluate
whether the effect of common ownership is different for the firms in industries with low HHI
versus industries with high HHI (Table F3, corresponds to Table 12 in the main body).
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Table 6.7: Panel results for cross-owned and not cross-owned firms
A. Dividends B. Buybacks C. Markup D. Capex E. M&A
CD = 1 CD = 0 CD = 1 CD = 0 CD = 1 CD = 0 CD = 1 CD = 0 CD = 1 CD = 0
DCO 1.347*** 0.260*** 1.961*** 0.383** 6.469 3.650 0.216 -0.273 -0.333 0.251
(6.11) (3.99) (4.15) (2.43) (1.51) (1.08) (0.44) (-1.55) (-0.53) (1.14)
DCO: Mean (Mean) 0.14 (0.16)
DepVar: Mean (Mean) 4.6 (16.0) 4.4 (10.5) 106.0 (486.5) 6.15 (16.8) 7.2 (11.3)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indus. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 7,934 70,553 7,934 70,553 7,934 70,553 7,898 70,273 7,731 68,407
Industr. (SIC3) 226 245 226 245 226 245 226 245 226 245
R2 0.677 0.711 0.567 0.514 0.195 0.043 0.598 0.404 0.305 0.134
Dependent variable is indicated in each of the four panels. Two subsets are considered - where CrossDummy is 1 (CD = 1) and where it is 0 (CD
= 0). DCO is density of common ownership. Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market
capitalization. Covariates are Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI, Size. Parentheses contain
t-statistics. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values
for payouts and M&A
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Table 6.8: Panel results by ‘China shock’ effect
A. Dividends B. Buybacks C. Markup D. Capex E. M&A
High CS Low CS High CS Low CS High CS Low CS High CS Low CS High CS Low CS
DCO -0.777** 0.639*** 2.641** 4.958*** 9.475* 8.303 0.421 0.680 3.132** -1.251**
(-1.97) (3.58) (2.52) (9.70) (1.92) (1.26) (0.88) (1.58) (2.13) (-2.17)
DCO: Mean (Mean) 0.14 (0.16)
DepVar: Mean (Mean) 4.6 (16.0) 4.4 (10.5) 106.0 (486.5) 6.15 (16.8) 7.2 (11.3)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 3,077 6,400 3,077 6,400 3,077 6,400 3,077 6,400 3,067 6,394
Industries (SIC3) 33 61 33 61 33 61 33 61 33 61
R2 0.588 0.403 0.627 0.359 0.533 0.331 0.513 0.050 0.317 0.616
Each regression is estimated for two-subsets, which respectively contain companies from the industries with low and high China shock. These are
respectively below and above the median value. Dividends, Buybacks, Capex and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO is density of common
ownership. Fixed effects are included for SIC3 industries and years. Regressions are weighted using total market capitalization. Covariates are
Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1, Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI.
t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The analysis is performed on the matched sample. Included mean
and sd are general sample statistics conditional on positive values for payouts and M&A
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Table 6.9: Panel results by industry concentration
A. Dividends B. Buybacks C. Markup D. Capex E. M&A
Low HHI High HHI Low HHI High HHI Low HHI High HHI Low HHI High HHI Low HHI High HHI
DCO 0.758*** 0.349*** 1.314*** -0.036 23.407** -0.370 -1.878*** -0.332** 2.426*** -0.096
(4.78) (4.09) (3.43) (-0.16) (2.42) (-0.59) (-3.89) (-2.15) (4.39) (-0.36)
DCO: Mean (Mean) 0.14 (0.16)
DepVar: Mean (Mean) 4.6 (16.0) 4.4 (10.5) 106.0 (486.5) 6.15 (16.8) 7.2 (11.3)
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. obs 50,793 12,780 50,793 12,780 50,793 12,780 50,572 12,742 49,248 12,422
Industries (SIC3) 33 61 33 61 33 61 33 61 33 61
R2 0.665 0.738 0.508 0.598 0.035 0.647 0.386 0.539 0.137 0.229
Data is grouped into two samples - low industry concentration (HHI ≤ 1, 500) and low industry concentration (HHI ≥ 2, 500). Dependent variables -
Dividends, Buybacks, Capex and M&A are scaled by total assets. DCO - density of common ownership, measures common ownership concentration. Fixed
effects included for SIC3 industries and years. Regression weights - Total market value. Covariates are Size, Leverage, Net Income, Cash/TA, Divt−1/TAt−1,
Net BBt−1/TAt−1, HHI. t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included mean and sd are general sample statistics
(conditional on positive values for all payouts and M&A)
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6.2 B: Gray Divorce Auxiliary Materials
6.2.1 Unmatched sample descriptive statistics
Table 6.10: Unmatched sample descriptive statistics
Divorced Married
Mean SD Mean SD Difference t-stat p-val
Non-white, % 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.00*** 0.25 0.80
Protestant, % 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 -0.01*** -1.04 0.30
Catholic, % 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.03*** 3.35 0.00
Age, years 62.03 9.87 61.71 9.62 0.33*** 1.40 0.16
HH size 2.12 1.30 2.58 1.29 -0.45*** -14.60 0.00
Total income 54880.91 226211.26 52700.74 62487.34 2180.17*** 0.55 0.58
Capital income 15439.63 196707.33 8449.66 31937.61 6989.97*** 2.09 0.04
Net worth 224131.72 649289.76 220808.44 368213.39 3323.28*** 0.26 0.79
Hous. wealth 155461.78 568066.34 140717.53 321081.07 14744.25*** 1.34 0.18
Fin. wealth 62013.03 358189.81 60072.13 209414.88 1940.91*** 0.28 0.78
Stocks 39389.87 266011.90 25998.29 107976.36 13391.58*** 2.78 0.01
Bonds 4637.49 54386.26 3635.51 38192.86 1001.98*** 0.89 0.37
Bank accs 14413.54 49663.65 17827.94 76333.86 -3414.40*** -2.21 0.03
CDs 3510.79 19680.61 6716.43 45700.30 -3205.64*** -3.80 0.00
V ehicles 11386.30 23842.79 13285.36 15756.79 -1899.05*** -3.95 0.00
IRA 30477.05 121602.37 36003.96 112110.04 -5526.91*** -1.98 0.05
All wealth variables are in per equivalent person basis. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Unmatched sample includes N1 = 4,472 treated and
N2 = 542,204 non-treated observations.
6.3 C: Modernization Hypothesis Auxiliary Materials
6.3.1 Data sources and details
Table 6.11: Data sources and details
Variable Measurement details Source
Uncertainty Months between collapse Own calculations,
of socialist system and first Walder et al. (2015)
legitimate parliamentary elections
Real GDP per capita US Dollars of 2010 World Bank, WDI
Gini index
Range from 0 (complete equality)






(lowest human development) to 1
United Nations Development
Program (UNDP)







From 0 (lowest democracy)
to 100 (highest democracy)
Freedom House
Freedom of press*
From 0 (lowest democracy)
to 100 (highest democracy)
Freedom House
Regime score*
From 0 (lowest democracy)
to 100 (highest democracy)
Polity International
Resource dependency US Dollars of 2010 World Bank, WDI
Market memory US Dollars of 2010 World Bank, WDI
Geographic location US Dollars of 2010 World Bank, WDI
State institutions
and Independence
Initial institutional country characteristics:
0 -newly created states,
De Melo (2001)
1- countries of federal states,
2- were independent before 1989
Regional tensions
Indicator of countries that had military
conflict due to border disputes
De Melo (2001)
*Further details of democracy variables are provided in Appendix C.2
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6.3.2 Democracy variables details
There is multitude of democracy indexes, among which there is heterogeneity with respect
to their input data sources, country and time coverage, and academic impact (Coppedge et al.
2016).
Political freedom Original measurement: defined on the scale between 0 and 100.
Freedom House determines countries as ’Free’ with values between 0-30, ’Partly free’ - 31-
60, and ’not free’ - 61-100. The variable was transformed to 0 - 100 scale to be increasing in
the level of Political freedom.
Political regime Original measurement: Based on Polity2 which is the difference be-
tween the polity Democracy index and Autocracy index for the same country. The original
Polity2 variable is defined on the range from -9 to +9. The variable was transformed to
0-100 scale to be increasing in the level of democracy.
Freedom of Press Original measurement: defined on the scale between 0 and 100,
where 100 represents the least freedom of the press. Variable was transformed to the scale 0
- 100, where indicator is increasing in the freedom of the press.
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6.3.3 Construction of political disruption variable
A main contribution of the current study is its development of a measurement of ’Political
disruption’ in CEE countries. The suggested measurement here closely followed the definition
of this phenomenon by Walder et al. (2015). The task requires that the start and the end
of ’political disruption’ is defined for each of the 28 CEE countries. Therefore ’political
disruption’ is synonymous to lack of legitimate power, and is measured as duration of the
uncertainty is defined as the length, in days, of the respective time interval. The approach
taken to code T1 and T2 is detailed below.
D = T2 − T1
Start of the uncertainty, T1, was determined as follows. For the countries that constituted
former Soviet Union, the uncertainty about the future ability of communist party emerged as
the party leadership implemented new policy of ’perestroika’ and ’glasnost’. The leadership
of communist party decided it has to change and implement elements of democracy and
private ownership into the Soviet economy. For post-USSR countries, the starting event
was the adoption of Law on Cooperatives. The law established the possibility of private
ownership and enabled private owners to implement international trade and other economic
transactions. As the relevant mechanisms were not yet properly defined, this caused processes
of cashing out state enterprises and transferring cash into off-shores, as well as de-facto
privatization of state enterprises at significant discount to their fair values. For the countries
that were not part of the Soviet Union, the beginning of ’political disruption’ was either a
decisive demonstration, a decisive protest, or other equally significant event, which involved
a large number of people, and led to the resign of communist presidents in those economies.
End of uncertainty, T2, was estimated as the date of the multi-party parliamentary
elections in the post-USSR economies. Multi-party parliamentary elections was the way
that new forces came to power and implement constitutional reform, as well as adopted
other important laws on the path of transition towards market economy. For the non-
USSR countries, the end of the ’political disruption’ period was the earlier of either multi-
party elections, or assignment of a new democratic government. There were no democratic
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governments assigned prior to multi-party elections in the post-USSR countries. In one of
the post-USSR countries, Turkmenistan, there were no multi-party elections, and the ’end’ of
political disruption was the date of referendum when the term of the president was extended
significantly without the need for re-election. This event ended the uncertainty regarding
the control over the country economy and de-facto established a dictatorship.
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6.3.4 List of CEE countries






5 Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH
6 Belarus BLR


























6.3.5 Pairwise correlation for the annual data
Table 6.13: Pairwise correlation for the annual data
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Uncertainty 1.000
(2) Marmem 0.872* 1.000
(3) Locat -0.376* -0.454* 1.000
(4) State -0.596* -0.420* 0.324* 1.000
(5) RT 0.182* 0.076* -0.347* -0.281* 1.000
(6) Fhouse -0.556* -0.629* 0.604* 0.468* -0.245* 1.000
(7) Polity -0.487* -0.539* 0.476* 0.430* -0.114* 0.869* 1.000
(8) Press -0.613* -0.705* 0.614* 0.377* -0.251* 0.943* 0.844* 1.000
(9) GDP -0.473* -0.515* 0.742* 0.232* -0.322* 0.604* 0.450* 0.622* 1.000
(10) GDP90 0.036 -0.182* 0.594* -0.218* -0.148* 0.396* 0.289* 0.442* 0.690* 1.000
(11) HDI -0.383* -0.448* 0.515* 0.132* -0.235* 0.504* 0.446* 0.533* 0.830* 0.584* 1.000
(12) Gini 0.399* 0.351* -0.291* -0.153* 0.332* -0.296* -0.145* -0.307* -0.490* -0.361* -0.365* 1.000
Variables: Uncertainty - measure of political uncertainty (disruption), Marmem - market memory, Locat - geographic location, State - state 
institutions and independence, RT - regional tensions, F house - Freedom House measure of democracy, P olity - political regime measure, Press - 
freedom of the press, GDP - real GDP per capita, GDP 90 - real GDP per capita in 1990, HDI - Human development index, Gini - Gini index. 
Significance: *- 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%.
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6.3.6 Democracy in CEE
Figure 6.2: Political freedom by country
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Figure 6.3: Polity regime by country
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Figure 6.4: Freedom of the press by country
7.0 Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2008). Oligarchic versus democratic societies. Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 6(1):1–44.
Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., and Price, B. (2016). Import competition
and the great us employment sag of the 2000s. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(1):141–198.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2008). Income and democracy.
American Economic Review, 98(3):808–42.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2009). Reevaluating the mod-
ernization hypothesis. Journal of monetary economics, 56(8):1043–1058.
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., and Robinson, J. A. (2019). Democracy does cause
growth. Journal of Political Economy, 127(1):47–100.
Almeida, H., Fos, V., and Kronlund, M. (2018). The real effect of share repurchases. Journal
of Financial Economics, 119:168–185.
Angrist, J. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Com-
panion. Princeton University Press.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton university press.
Anton, M. and Polk, C. (2014). Connected stocks. The Journal of Finance, LXIX:1099–1127.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies,
58(2):277–297.
Azar, J. (2011). A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversifica-
tion. SSRN Electronic Journal.
118
Azar, J. (2018). Anticompetitive effects of common ownership. The Journal of Finance,
LXXIII(4).
Azar, J., Raina, S., and Schmalz, M. (2016). Ultimate ownership and bank competition.
Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. Journal of economic growth, 1(1):1–27.
Becker, G. S., Landes, E. M., and Michael, R. T. (1977). An economic analysis of marital
instability. Journal of political Economy, 85(6):1141–1187.
Benhabib, J., Corvalan, A., and Spiegel, M. M. (2011). Reestablishing the income-democracy
nexus. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Benhabib, J., Corvalan, A., and Spiegel, M. M. (2013). Income and democracy: Evidence
from nonlinear estimations. Economics Letters, 118(3):489–492.
BenYishay, A. and Grosjean, P. (2014). Initial endowments and economic reform in 27
post-socialist countries. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42(4):892–906.
Brown, S. and Wright, M. (2017). Marriage, cohabitation, and divorce in later life. Innovation
in Aging.
Bugliari, D., Carroll, J., Hayden, O., Hayes, J., Hurd, M., and Karabatakis, A. (2020).
Rand hrs longitudinal file 2016 (v2) documentation. Technical report, RAND Center for
the Study of Ageing.
Cervellati, M., Jung, F., Sunde, U., and Vischer, T. (2014). Income and democracy: Com-
ment. American Economic Review, 104(2):707–19.
Chung, K. and Zhang, H. (2011). Corporate governance and institutional ownership. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(1):247–273.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bern-
hard, M., Fish, M., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., et al. (2016). V-dem codebook v6, varieties of
democracy (vdem) project. Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute.
119
Crane, A., Michenaud, S., and Weston, J. (2016). The effect of institutional ownership
on payout policy: Evidence from index thresholds. The Review of Financial Studies,
29(6):1377–1408.
Crowley, J. E. (2018). Gray Divorce: What we lose and gain from mid-life splits. University
of California Press.
De Melo, D. (2001). Circumstance and choice: the role of initial conditions and policies in
transition economies. World Bank Economic Review, 10(1):1–31.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., and Skinner, D. (2009). Corporate payout policy. Foundations
and Trends in Finance, 3:95–287.
Del Bono, E., Sala, E., Hancock, R., Gunnell, C., and Parisi, L. (2007). Gender, older people
and social exclusion: A gendered review and secondary analysis of the data. Technical
report, ISER Working Paper Series.
DeLiema, M., Deevy, M., Lusardi, A., and Mitchell, O. S. (2018). Financial fraud among
older americans: Evidence and implications. Technical report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Denis, D. and Osobov, I. (2008). Why do firms pay dividends? international evidence on
the determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89:62–82.
Dennis, P. J., Gerardi, K., and Schenone, C. (2018). Common ownership does not have
anti-competitive effects in the airline industry. Available at SSRN 3063465.
Farrell, J. (1985). Owner-consumers and efficiency. Economic Letters, 19:303–306.
FreedomHouse (2017). Freedom in the world 2017. populists and autocrats: The dual threat
to global democracy. Freedom House.
Fried, J. and Wang, C. (2018). Short-termism and capital flows. Working Paper 17-062.
120
Gardner, J. and Oswald, A. J. (2006). Do divorcing couples become happier by breaking up?
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 169(2):319–336.
Gareth, J., Witten, D., Hastie, T., and Tibshirani, R. (2013). An Introduction to Statistical
Learning: With Applications in R. Springer.
Geron, A. (2017). Hands-On Machine Learning with Scikit-Learn and TensorFlow. O’Reilly
Media.
Gilbert, D. L. (2017). The American class structure in an age of growing inequality. SAGE
publications.
Gilje, E., Gormley, T. A., and Levit, D. (2018). The rise of common ownership.
Grinstein, Y. and Michaely, R. (2005). Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy. The Journal
of Finance, LX(3).
Gutierrez, G. and Philippon, T. (2016). Investment-less growth: An empirical investigation.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gutierrez, G. and Philippon, T. (2018). Ownership, concentration and investment. AEA
Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, 108:432–437.
Gutiérrez, G. and Philippon, T. (2017). Declining Competition and Investment in the U.
Haider, S., Jacknowitz, A., and Schoeni, R. (2003). The economic status of elderly divorced
women. Research Paper No. WP2003-046.
He, J. and Huang, J. (2017). Product market competition in a world of cross-ownership:
Evidence from institutional blockholdings. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(8):2674–
2718.
Hellman, J. S. (1998). Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist
transitions. World politics, 50(2):203–234.
121
Ho, D., Imai, K., King, G., and Stuart, E. (2007a). Matching as nonparametric preprocessing
for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference. Political analysis, 15(3):199–
236.
Ho, D., Imai, K., King, G., and Stuart, E. (2007b). Matchit: Nonparametric preprocessing
for parametric causal inference. Journal of Statistical Software.
Houge, T. and Wellman, J. (2005). Fallout from the mutual fund tracking scandal. Journal
of Business Ethics, 62:129–139.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4):305–360.
King, G. and Nielsen, R. (2018). Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Kisin, R. (2011). The impact of shareholders on corporate investment: Evidence from mutual
fund holdings. Washington university.
Koch, A., Panayides, M., and Thomas, S. (2018). Commonality in institutional ownership
and competition in product markets. Working paper, University of Pittsburgh.
Koch, A., Panayides, M., and Thomas, S. (2019). Common Ownership and Competition in
Product Markets. Available at: available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965058.
Lazonick, W. (2014). Profits without prosperity. Harvard Business Review.
Lipset, S. (1960). Martin, political man: The social bases of politics.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and
political legitimacy. American political science review, 53(1):69–105.
Luo, Y., Hawkley, L. C., Waite, L. J., and Cacioppo, J. T. (2012). Loneliness, health, and
mortality in old age: a national longitudinal study. Social science & medicine, 74(6):907–
914.
122
Maddison, A. (2010). Statistics on world population, gdp and per capita gdp, 1-2008 ad.
Historical Statistics, pages 1–36.
Matvos, G. and Ostrovsky, M. (2008). Cross-ownership, returns, and voting in mergers.
Journal of Financial Economics, 89(3):391–403.
Mazzonna, F., Peracchi, F., et al. (2018). Self-assessed cognitive ability and financial wealth:
Are people aware of their cognitive decline? Technical report, Einaudi Institute for Eco-
nomics and Finance (EIEF).
OECD (2011). Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. OECD Publishing.
Passarelli, F. and Tabellini, G. (2017). Emotions and political unrest. Journal of Political
Economy, 125(3):903–946.
Pierce, J. R. and Schott, P. K. (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of us manufacturing
employment. American Economic Review, 106(7):1632–62.
Randolph, J., Falbe, K., Kureethara, A., and Balloun, J. (2014). A step-by-step guide to
propensity score matching in r. Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation, 19(18):1–6.
Rodrik, D. and Wacziarg, R. (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic
outcomes? American Economic Review, 95(2):50–55.
Rojas, M. (2014). Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer Nether-
lands, Dordrecht.
Rotemberg, J. (1984). Financial transaction costs and industrial performance. MIT Press.
Schmalz, M. (2018). Common-ownership concentration and corporate conduct. Annual
Review of Financial Economics, 10:413–448.
Sharma, A. (2015). Divorce/separation in later-life: A fixed effects analysis of economic
well-being by gender. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 36(2):299–306.
123
Smock, P., Manning, W., and Gupta, S. (1999). The effect of marriage and divorce on
women’s economic well-being. American Sociological Review, 64(6):794–812.
South, S. J. and Spitze, G. (1986). Determinants of divorce over the marital life course.
American sociological review, pages 583–590.
Stepler, R. (2017). Led by baby boomers, divorce rates climb for america’s 50+ population.
Technical report, Pew Research.
Taddy, M. (2019). Business Data Science. McGraw Hill.
Walder, A. G., Isaacson, A., and Lu, Q. (2015). After state socialism: the political origins
of transitional recessions. American Sociological Review, 80(2):444–468.
Wucherpfennig, J. and Deutsch, F. (2009). Modernization and democracy: Theories and
evidence revisited. Living Reviews in Democracy, 1.
Zagorsky, J. L. (2005). Marriage and divorce’s impact on wealth. Journal of Sociology,
41(4):406–424.
124
